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1. Colorado Basins, State of Colorado Department of Natural Resources Division of 
Water Resources, Mar. 16, 2005, available at http://water.state.co.us/
DWRIPub/DWR%20Maps/ColoradoRiverBasins.pdf. 
222 Colo. Nat. Resources, Energy & Envtl. L. Rev. [Vol. 26:2 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The San Luis Valley (“the Valley”) is a broad, high-altitude valley 
in south-central Colorado, extending southward to the New Mexico state 
line. Two mountain ranges—the Sangre de Cristo Mountains to the east 
and the San Juan Mountains to the west—border the Valley. The Rio 
Culebra flows westward from its source in the Sangre de Cristos through 
the southeastern portion of the Valley toward the Rio Grande, to which it 
used to be tributary. A number of smaller tributary creeks feed the Rio 
Culebra, arising in the Sangre de Cristos and flowing into the Culebra on 
the valley floor west of the mountains. The San Luis Valley is home to 
the oldest and longest continually occupied non-native indigenous 
communities in the state of Colorado.
2
 These communities, centered in 
and around the Culebra watershed, were founded by Hispanic settlers 
who moved from what is now New Mexico to occupy the Sangre de 
Cristo Land Grant—a million-acre tract of land the Mexican government 
granted to a Taos businessman.
3
 Shortly before Mexico ceded 
sovereignty over the Valley to the United States in the aftermath of the 
Mexican-American War, the settlers established the first community 
irrigation ditches, known as acequias, along the Rio Culebra.
4
 In the 
following decades, the Sangre de Cristo Grant was sold to Anglo-
American investors. Subsequently, the Grant became the subject of 
international financial speculation and fueled grand dreams of 
development of the sort that touched many corners of the American West 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
5
 In the San Luis 
Valley, making these dreams a reality would require land, water, and 
other resources—resources that the original settlers already claimed and 
used. Not surprisingly, conflict arose between the investors and the 
parciantes—the traditional users of the original Culebra acequias. 
This Article addresses one aspect of that conflict, a struggle over the 
right to use water from the Rio Culebra and its tributaries. This struggle 
 
2. Tom I. Romero, II, Uncertain Waters and Contested Lands: Excavating the 
Layers of Colorado’s Legal Past, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 521, 534–35 (2002). 
3. Id. at 569–71. 
4. See Gregory A. Hicks & Devon G. Peña, Customary Practice and Community 
Governance in Implementing the Human Right to Water: The Case of the Acequia 
Communities of Colorado’s Rio Culebra Watershed, 18 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DIS. 
RES. 185, 190 (2010). 
5. Gregory A. Hicks & Devon G. Peña, Community Acequias in Colorado’s Rio 
Culebra Watershed: A Customary Commons in the Domain of Prior Appropriation, 74 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 387, 426–27 (2003). 
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for water produced the Hallett Decrees,
6
 which were issued by the 
United States Circuit Court for the District of Colorado in 1900.
7
 The 
Hallett Decrees transferred water rights belonging to the parciantes under 
Colorado law to the owner of the Sangre de Cristo Grant, the United 
States Freehold Land and Emigration Company (“Freehold”).
8
 Because 
the Decrees were entered by a federal court but purport to affect state 
water rights, their validity and effect became a source of controversy 
soon after they were entered.
9
 Presently, the validity of the Decrees and 
ownership and use of the water rights they transferred to Freehold 
(“Freehold Interests”) remains in controversy. Indeed, the issuance of the 
Hallett Decrees created more than a century of confusion and conflict 
over the administration of water rights in Colorado’s Water District 24, 




This Article chronicles the history of the Hallett Decrees from their 
inception to the present in an attempt to understand how the Decrees 
came to be, their legal validity and effect, and the practical effects the 
Decrees had on water rights administration in District 24 over the last 
115 years. The main objective of this Article is to understand the Hallett 
Decrees and the conflicts they engendered in an attempt to facilitate an 
equitable resolution of this century-old dispute. A resolution could 
potentially benefit all parties by reducing the resentment and uncertainty 
that were stirred up by the Decrees and that have lingered in the Rio 
Culebra watershed for more than a century. 
Ownership of the water rights transferred to Freehold under the 
Hallett Decrees passed through several entities during the first half of the 
twentieth century before the final entity with deeded ownership of the 
rights dissolved in 1956. Accordingly, this Article concludes that it is 
likely that no one has owned or legally used the majority of the Freehold 
Interests since 1956. However, parciantes on the Rio Culebra acequias 
assert that they have continued to use at least some portion of the 
Freehold Interests since 1900; use apparently facilitated during some 
periods by unofficial policies of the Division Engineer. Based on this 
 
6. The decrees are known as the “Hallett Decrees” because Moses Hallett was the 
judge who entered them, but are also sometimes referred to as the “Freehold Decrees” 
after one of the parties, the United States Freehold Land and Emigration Company.   
7. Decrees for Water from the Culebra River and Other Streams in Costilla County, 
Colorado 95 (C.C.D. Colo. July 17, 1900) [hereinafter Hallett Decrees]. 
8. Id. at 97.  
9. See infra Part III.A. 
10. District 24 is part of Colorado Water Division 3, the Rio Grande River Basin. 
The District lies in Costilla County, and is headquartered in Alamosa, Colorado. See 
supra note 1. 
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use, the parciantes could bring adverse possession claims in an attempt to 
regain ownership of at least a portion of the Freehold Interests. This 
Article concludes, however, that adverse possession litigation would be 
complex, expensive, and contentious, and might or might not result in the 
transfer of some of the Freehold Interests to parciantes. In contrast, a 
negotiated settlement to preserve the status quo approved by a Colorado 
water court could prevent injury to other water rights users, reduce 
resentment and uncertainty, and likely return ownership of some of the 
Freehold Interests to parciantes on the original Culebra acequias. 
This Article proceeds in six Parts. Following this introduction, Part 
II provides historical background for the Hallett Decrees, recounts the 
events that led to the entry of the Decrees, and describes water rights use 
and development in the Rio Culebra watershed in the decades following 
the Decrees. Part III then undertakes an analysis of the legal validity and 
effects of the Hallett Decrees. Part IV explores potential legal resolutions 
to the controversies engendered by the Hallett Decrees. Part V proposes a 
settlement resolution amongst the affected parties. Part VI provides a 
brief summary and conclusion. 
II. THE HISTORY AND EFFECTS OF THE HALLETT 
DECREES 
This Part provides background information necessary for an 
understanding of the origins and effects of the Hallett Decrees and the 
current status of the Freehold Interests. Section II.A presents a brief 
account of the non-indigenous settlement of the Culebra watershed and 
introduces the two main players in the creation of the Hallett Decrees—
the original Hispanic settlers of the Culebra watershed and the United 
States Freehold Land and Emigration Company. Section II.B provides 
background information on Colorado water law and the first adjudication 
of water rights for the Rio Culebra watershed. Section II.C relates the 
story of the lawsuit that resulted in the Hallett Decrees. Section II.D 
covers the role the Freehold Interests played in the 1905 supplemental 
adjudication of water rights in Water District 24. Finally, Section II.E 
discusses the Sanchez Reservoir System—an extensive system of 
reservoirs and canals constructed by one of Freehold’s successors in an 
attempt to make use of the Freehold Interests. 
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A. Non-Indigenous Settlement in the Rio Culebra Watershed 
The following Section provides a brief overview of the history of 
European settlement on the Rio Culebra and the still largely Hispanic 
population that lives and farms in the area today.
11
 The Culebra was 
originally settled by Hispanic emigrants from what is now New Mexico 
who employed traditional, communal methods of resource development 
and use. Soon after these settlers established themselves, however, 
investors from the Eastern United States purchased the majority of the 
land in the Culebra watershed, making the Culebra the subject of 
international financial speculation and plans for large-scale development. 
Friction between these different approaches to resource use and 
development led to a number of legal battles, one of which eventually 
produced the Hallett Decrees. 
Spain controlled what is now the Southwestern United States until 
1821, when Mexico gained independence and took control of the 
territory.
12
 Spanish military expeditions began exploring the San Luis 
Valley in the eighteenth century, but it was not until the opening of the 
Santa Fe Trail, also in 1821, that Spanish civilians began to follow.
13
 
Both the Spanish and Mexican governments encouraged agricultural 
settlement by making land grants to individuals and communities.
14
 
Settlers on such grants often established acequia irrigation 
communities,
15
 in which long, narrow, privately owned parcels of land 
were laid out perpendicularly to a communally constructed and 
maintained irrigation ditch, or acequia.
16
 This system guaranteed each 
family frontage on the acequia, grazing land, and upland access for 
gathering firewood and hunting game.
17
 Acequia communities treated 
water as a communal resource, distributing it partially on the basis of 
 
11. According to 2010 census data, the population of Costilla County, Colorado is 
66% Hispanic or Latino, and 84.3% of the town of San Luis, Colorado is Hispanic or 
Latino. AMERICAN FACTFINDER, http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/
community_facts.xhtml (last visited May 12, 2014) [hereinafter 2010 Census Data]. 
12. ALAN KNIGHT, MEXICO: VOLUME II, THE COLONIAL ERA 330 – 331 (2002). Juan 
O’Donojú, a Spanish miliary official, signed the Treaty of Córdoba on August 24, 1821, 
but the Spanish monarchy did not officially recognize Mexican independence for another 
fifteen years. Id.  
13. Kenneth W. Knox, The Costilla Creek Compact, 6 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 
453, 453 (2003). 
14. DEVON PEÑA, MEXICAN AMERICANS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: TIERRA Y VIDA 79–
81 (2005). 
15. Hicks & Peña, supra note 4, at 391–92. 
16. PEÑA, supra note 14, at 81. 
17. Id.  




 Tracts of pasture and forestland were also held and 
utilized communally.
19
 Many acequia communities are still in operation, 
and continue to employ principles of water sharing that have their origins 
in Arabic and Mesoamerican traditions.
20
 
The ancestors of those who continue to irrigate in the Rio Culebra 
watershed today came to the area beginning in late 1840s to settle on the 
one-million acre Sangre de Cristo Land Grant.
21
 In 1844, the Mexican 
government presented the grant to Steven Luis Lee, then governor of 
Taos, and Narciso Beaubien, the twelve-year-old son of Taos 
businessman Carlos Beaubien.
22
 Following the Mexican-American War 
of 1846–48, the United States annexed the area through the Treaty of 
Guadalupe Hidalgo.
23
 The Treaty allowed Mexican citizens in the 
acquired territory to become U.S. citizens if they chose to remain in the 
United States, and stated that property rights granted or held under 
Mexican law would be respected.
24
 In 1856, the Surveyor General 
recommended that Congress confirm the Sangre de Cristo Grant as the 
property of Carlos Beaubien, who had acquired the Grant after the 
original grantees were killed in the Taos Uprising of 1847.
25
 Congress 
acted on the Surveyor’s recommendation on June 21, 1860, confirming 
the Grant to Beaubien in an Act entitled “An Act to confirm certain 
private land-claims in the Territory of New Mexico.”
26
 
As soon as he acquired the Sangre de Cristo Grant from the original 
grantees, Carlos Beaubien began recruiting settlers and establishing 
communities.
27
 The first successful settlement of the Rio Culebra 
watershed occurred in the late 1840s, and by 1852 parciantes had 
constructed the first Rio Culebra acequia, the San Luis People’s Ditch.
28
 
By the time the Rio Culebra became part of the newly formed Colorado 
 
18. Hicks & Peña, supra note 4, at 392. 
19. Id. 
20. See generally Juan Estevan Arellano, La Cuenca y la Querencia: The 
Watershed and the Sense of Place in the Merced and Acequia Landscape, in THINKING 
LIKE A WATERSHED: VOICES FROM THE WEST (Jack Loeffler & Celestia Loeffler eds., 
2012) (discussing the origins of “traditional agriculture” in the Rio Grande Basin). 
21. Tameling v. U.S. Freehold & Emigration Co., 93 U.S. 644, 647 (1876); Hicks & 
Peña, supra note 5, at 407–08. 
22. Knox, supra note 13, at 454. 
23. Romero, supra note 2, at 535 n.70.  
24. See Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settlement (Treaty of Guadalupe 
Hidalgo), U.S.-Mex., arts. VIII, IX, Feb. 2, 1848, 9 Stat. 922. 
25. Tameling, 93 U.S. at 660; Hicks & Peña, supra note 5, at 408–09. 
26. Tameling, 93 U.S. at 659–60. 
27. Hicks & Peña, supra note 5, at 408–09. 
28. Id. 
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Territory in 1861, more than 1,700 people lived in the watershed, and 
parciantes had constructed fourteen additional acequias.
29
 In 1863, 
Beaubien provided deeds to the parciantes whom he had recruited to 
settle in the Culebra watershed.
30
 At the same time, Beaubien executed 
the “Beaubien Document,” which promised that “all the [parciantes] will 
have enjoyment of benefits of pastures, water, firewood and timber, 
always taking care that one does not injure another.”
31
 
Not long after Spanish and Mexican parciantes established the 
original acequias on the Rio Culebra, Americans with different 
development ambitions began to buy up land in the area. After Carlos 
Beaubien’s death in 1864, William Gilpin, then governor of the Colorado 
Territory, purchased the majority of the Sangre de Cristo Land Grant 
from Beaubien’s estate.
32
 In the sales agreement, Gilpin promised to give 
deeds to the original parciantes who had not yet received them, and to 
respect the “settlement rights” Beaubien had granted to the parciantes.
33
 
In total, Gilpin paid $41,000 for the million-acre Grant—approximately 
four cents per acre.
34
 
Gilpin and his business associates planned to sell the Grant to 
investors, who would then profit by selling plots of land to new settlers 
and controlling vital resources such as timber and water.
35
 An 1868 
pamphlet published by a company Gilpin and his associates created to 
market the Grant stated that, while land would be sold to settlers for 
grazing or farming, “all minerals thereon, and the right of water and 
 
29. Id. at 416–17. 
30. Lobato v. Taylor, 71 P.3d 938, 943 (Colo. 2002). 
31. Id. at 946–47. 
32. Articles of Obligation and Agreement between William Gilpin and the 
executors of Charles Beaubien’s will (Apr. 7, 1864), in COSTILLA COUNTY, COLORADO, 
RECORD BOOK 1, at 241(County Recorder’s Office, San Luis, Colorado) (on file with 
authors) [hereinafter Articles of Obligation and Agreement]. 
33. Id.; see also Lobato, 71 P.3d at 943. 
34. HERBERT O. BRAYER, WILLIAM BLACKMORE: THE SPANISH-MEXICAN LAND 
GRANTS OF NEW MEXICO AND COLORADO 1863–1878, 66–67 (1949). 
35. Gilpin was a member of a generation that believed deeply in the Jeffersonian 
ideal of settlement, development, and the “yeoman farmer.” See ALAN TRACHTENBERG, 
THE INCORPORATION OF AMERICA: CULTURE AND SOCIETY IN THE GILDED AGE 11–12 
(2007). In his public speeches and writings, Gilpin resoundingly praised the progress of 
development throughout the United State’s territory. See generally WILLIAM GILPIN, 
MISSION OF THE NORTH AMERICAN PEOPLE, GEOGRAPHICAL, SOCIAL, AND POLITICAL 
(1874). At that time, the federal government was also consistently encouraging settlement 
through programs such as the Homestead Act of 1862, ch. 75, §1, 12 Stat. 392 (1862) 
(repealed 1976).   
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timber for working the same [will] be reserved by the company.”
36
 Their 
attempts to sell off parts of the Grant in the Eastern U.S. were 
unsuccessful, however, so Gilpin and his associates attempted to market 
it to European investors.
37
 Reasoning that such investors would be more 
likely to buy shares in development companies than to purchase the 
Grant itself, in 1869 the group split the Grant into two “estates” and set 
about incorporating land companies to promote settlement on each 
estate.
38
 They called the southern portion of the Grant, which 
encompassed the Rio Culebra watershed, the Costilla Estate.
39
 
In their attempts to sell the Sangre de Cristo Grant, Gilpin and his 
associates entertained and promoted dreams of lush farms, rich mines, 
extensive development, and large profits. In an 1869 letter, one of 
Gilpin’s associates speculated that once the Grant was accessible by 
railroad—which would surely be soon—its lands, mineral value aside, 
would be worth five dollars per acre, “and in five years they will be 
worth $10 per acre.”
40
 Ferdinand Hayden, a government surveyor 
famous for his explorations of the West, surveyed the Grant and 
enthused: “I know of no region of the West more desirable for settlement 
than [the Sangre de Cristo Grant], combining as it does all of the 
elements of wealth and productiveness.”
41
 The Grant was “the finest 
agricultural district . . . west of the Missouri River,” its mountains were 
“charged with ores of gold, silver, copper, lead and iron,” and it would 
no doubt become “immensely valuable at no distant period.”
42
 Gilpin, a 
hyperbolic booster of the West’s potential for development in general,
43
 
promoted Colorado and the Grant through his public speaking 
engagements in the U.S. and Europe.
44
 Indeed, Gilpin’s claims regarding 
 
36. BRAYER, supra note 36, at 71 (quoting MORTON C. FISHER, DESCRIPTION OF THE 
PARKS OF COLORADO AND THE ESTATE OF THE COLORADO FREEHOLD LAND ASSOCIATION 
LIMITED 23 (1868)). 
37. Id. at 70. 
38. Id. at 76. 
39. Hicks & Peña, supra note 5, at 426. The northern portion of the Grant, which is 
not addressed in this Article, was called the Trinchera Estate, and Gilpin and his 
associates incorporated the Colorado Freehold Land and Emigration Company to develop 
it. BRAYER, supra note 34, at 76. 
40. BRAYER, supra note 34, at 76 (quoting Letter from Charles Lambard to William 
Blackmore (Jan. 9, 1869)). 
41. Id. at 74 (quoting Letter from Professor F.V. Hayden (Dec. 5, 1868), reprinted 
in WILLIAM BLACKMORE, COLORADO: ITS RESOURCES, PARKS AND PROSPECTS AS A NEW 
FIELD FOR EMIGRATION; WITH AN ACCOUNT OF THE TRENCHARA AND COSTILLA ESTATES IN 
THE SAN LUIS PARK 196–200 (1869)). 
42. Id. 
43. See WALLACE STEGNER, BEYOND THE HUNDREDTH MERIDIAN 2–5 (1982). 
44. GILPIN, supra note 35, at 215–23 app. 
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the wonders and bright future of the San Luis Valley led Wallace Stegner 
to note that, according to Gilpin, “San Luis Park would in time become 
as renowned as the Vale of Kashmir.”
45
 
In early 1870, Gilpin and his associates incorporated the United 
States Freehold Land and Emigration Company in Colorado Territory.
46
 
Freehold’s purpose was “to colonize, settle, improve and induce 
emigration to [the Costilla Estate].”
47
 Gilpin and his associates quickly 
sold the Costilla Estate to Freehold,
48
 and induced a group of Dutch 
investors to purchase the company’s bonds.
49
 The Dutch investors, 
however, insisted that Freehold be incorporated through an act of the 
United States Congress, rather than merely under the laws of Colorado 
Territory.
50
 Gilpin lobbied for congressional incorporation in 
Washington D.C., and after considerable political maneuvering and 
debate, a bill incorporating Freehold passed both the House and Senate.
51
 
With congressional incorporation secured, plans to develop the 
Costilla Estate proceeded. Freehold seemed to view the Costilla Estate as 
a place where it could exercise sovereign-like control over political and 
economic life—a blank slate on which to realize its ambitions for 
development.
52
 In 1871, Freehold representatives toured the Estate and 
 
45. STEGNER, supra note 43, at 4. 
46. BRAYER, supra note 34, at 81. Many notable historical figures were involved in 
Freehold. Id. at 81–82. David H. Moffat, Jr., a prominent Denver banker and railroad 
promoter, after whom the Moffat Tunnel was named, was one of Freehold’s 
incorporators. BRAYER, supra note 34, at 81; see also Ed Quillen, Name that Pass, 
DENVER POST, Apr. 18, 2010, http://www.denverpost.com/ci_14893605. Among 
Freehold’s original directors were civil war general Ambrose Burnside and General 
Robert C. Schenck, who at the time was the chairman of the Ways and Means Committee 
of the U.S. House of Representatives. BRAYER, supra note 34, at 82.   
47. BRAYER, supra note 34, at 82 (quoting Certificate of Incorporation, Book C., 
Office of the Secretary of State, Denver, Colorado).  
48. Indenture between Freehold and Ambrose Burnside, Rudolph Burlage, and 
Ambrose Meyer (July 15, 1870), in COSTILLA COUNTY, COLORADO, RECORD BOOK 1, at 
416 (County Recorder’s Office, San Luis, Colorado) (stating that Freehold purchased the 
Costilla Estate from Morton Fischer on July 14, 1870, that the Costilla Estate comprises 
the southern 500,000 acres of the Sangre de Cristo Grant) (on file with authors). The 
legal description of the Costilla Estate contained in the indenture describes the Costilla 
Estate as being bounded on the west by the Rio Grande and on the east by the crest of the 
Sangre de Cristos. See id. The Estate extends south into modern day New Mexico, and 
north to just north of the Rio Culebra. See id. 
49. BRAYER, supra note 34, at 81. 
50. Id. at 82–83. 
51. See id. at 83–86. General Robert C. Schenck, both one of Freehold’s directors 
and chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, was instrumental in moving the 
Freehold incorporation bill through the House of Representatives. Id. at 85 n.56. 
52. See id. at 95–98, 104–06. 




 Roads would be constructed and homes built for 
prospective immigrants.
54
 The company would purchase agricultural and 
industrial implements for immigrants to use and erect mills and shops.
55
 
A surveyor would be employed to map out a reservoir site and system of 
irrigation canals, which would be constructed as soon as possible.
56
 On 
the sagebrush flats near the Rio Grande a townsite would be laid out, 
including a “scenic boulevard with grass and trees, two hundred feet in 
width and running along the river front for a distance one mile above and 
one mile below the townsite.”
57
 One representative predicted that the 




Freehold intended to settle the Costilla Estate through a “colony” 
system like the one utilized in Greeley, Colorado.
59
 The company 
arranged to hire “emigration agents” in Germany and Holland who 
would be paid “five dollars per head of family or adult” to recruit 
immigrants.
60
 The company’s directors appointed Gilpin to be “resident 
managing director” on the Costilla Estate, and directed him to build a 
“printing plant,” publish a weekly newspaper, and “maintain . . . a library 
and museum.”
61
 Freehold intended to build an entire community from 
scratch, according to its own design.
62
 The degree of control the 
company sought to exercise is illustrated by its directors’ decision to 
secure the election of one of its employees as county recorder of Costilla 
County.
63
 This public servant/Freehold employee would be paid by the 
company and charged with “assisting Governor Gilpin in the selection of 
farms of such area and character as will be most suitable to the wants and 
requirements of the [immigrants].”
64
 
Though Freehold treated the Costilla Estate as a blank slate for the 
purpose of making its development plans, by the early 1870s the original 
settlers and their patterns of land ownership and resource use were 
 
53. Id. at 104–06. 
54. BRAYER, supra note 34, at 104–06. 
55. Id. at 98. 
56. Id. at 104–06. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. at 106 (quoting Memorandum of matters discussed and arranged at a meeting 
of Gov. Gilpin, Mr. Squarey, Mr. Blackmore (Sept. 9, 1871)). 
59. BRAYER, supra note 34, at 95. 
60. Id. at 98. 
61. Id. at 99. 
62. See id. at 95–98, 104–06. 
63. BRAYER, supra note 34, at 97. 
64. Id. 




 The fact that communities already existed on 
the Costilla Estate was a frustrating reality; to establish its desired order, 
Freehold would need to find a way to either accommodate or erase the 
existing one.
66
 Accordingly, at the same 1871 meeting at which 
Freehold’s representatives outlined their plans for the Costilla Estate, 
they resolved to deal with the claims of the original parciantes, most of 
whom opposed Freehold’s plans and disputed its title to the Estate.
67
 The 
parciantes had settled on the best farmlands,
68
 and to irrigate these lands 
had constructed acequias and appropriated vital water supplies.
69
 In 
addition, the parciantes claimed the right to graze their livestock and cut 
timber on unoccupied lands.
70
 Freehold recognized that the original 
parciantes recruited by Beaubien had rights to their individual plots of 
land, but also knew that it would need to limit the extent of the 
parcientes’ claims to land and resources if its ambitions for the Costilla 
Estate were to be realized.
71
 
Freehold first attempted to deal with the parciantes’ claims through 
negotiation. One of the main areas of dispute between Freehold and the 
parciantes was how the parciantes’ claims to the land they had settled on 
would be recognized.
72
 Carlos Beaubien had promised deeds to the 
parciantes he recruited, and issued deeds to some, but many parciantes 
had not received deeds from Beaubien before his death, and thus had no 
proof of their ownership.
73
 This difficult situation was further 
complicated by Gilpin having promised, in purchasing the Sangre de 
Cristo Grant, to give deeds to the original parciantes who did not yet 
have them.
74
 Yet another layer of complexity was added by the fact that, 
in the years after Gilpin acquired the Sangre de Cristo Grant, Hispanic 
settlers continued to push north onto the Grant from New Mexico.
75
 
These “squatters” could claim no title from Beaubien but were difficult 
to distinguish from original parciantes.
76
 Though Freehold made efforts 
 
65. Id. at 107–08. 
66. Id.  
67. Id. at 105–07. 
68. BRAYER, supra note 34, at 108. 
69. Id.; Decree, In the Matter of a Certain Petition for the Adjudication of Water 
Rights for Irrigation in Water Dist. No. 24, June 14, 1889 [hereinafter 1889 Decree]. 
70. BRAYER, supra note 34, at 108. 
71. See id. at 107–10. 
72. Id. at 108–09. 
73. Id. at 107. 
74. See Articles of Obligation and Agreement, supra note 32 and accompanying 
text. 
75. Hicks & Peña, supra note 5, at 426. 
76. See id. at 427. 
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to differentiate between original parciantes and later-arriving “squatters,” 
Freehold officials generally viewed all of the Hispanic settlers as barriers 
to their plans for development.
77
 The company eventually negotiated an 
agreement with the parciantes that provided for recognition of their 
claims to the lands on which they had settled, but the agreement fell apart 
because the parties could not agree on whether the parciantes would be 
allowed to graze livestock and cut timber on unoccupied lands.
78
 
When negotiation failed, Freehold turned to litigation. It initiated 
ejectment proceedings against some “squatters,”
79
 and in 1890 
challenged the parciantes’ right to use the water of the Rio Culebra 
watershed in federal court.
80
 This challenge pitted the parciantes’ water 
rights—which they had acquired by using the waters of the Culebra and 
its tributaries, and which had been recognized in 1889 by a Colorado 
court applying the prior appropriation doctrine—against Freehold’s 
assertion that its ownership of the Costilla Estate gave it the right to 
control the Estate’s waters.
81
 After ten years and a trip to the Eighth 
Circuit Court of Appeals (which included Colorado before the Tenth 
Circuit was created), Freehold’s lawsuit was resolved by a series of 
consent decrees between Freehold and the parciantes on each acequia. In 
the decrees, the parciantes agreed to give Freehold a portion of the water 
rights they had obtained under state law in 1889.
82
 These decrees are 
commonly known as the “Freehold Decrees” or the “Hallett Decrees,” 
after Freehold or Judge Moses Hallett, the federal judge who approved 
them.
83
 After the Hallett Decrees were entered in 1900, Freehold and its 
 
77. Id. at 427. 
78. BRAYER, supra note 34, at 109–10. The issue of the rights of the original 
parciantes and their successors to graze livestock and cut timber on open areas of the 
Costilla Estate was finally resolved in Lobato v. Taylor, 71 P.3d 938 (Colo. 2002), in 
which the Colorado Supreme Court ruled that the descendants of the original settlers had 
the right to graze livestock and cut timber on a privately held ranch encompassing a large 
portion of the mountainous uplands of the Costilla Estate. 
79. Tameling, 93 U.S. at 660–61. 
80. Complaint at 4, Vigil v. Swanson, (Costilla Cnty. Dist. Ct. 1914).  
81. See 1889 Decree, supra note 69. The 1889 Decree is discussed in detail infra in 
Section II(b).  
82. Hallett Decrees, supra note 7; 1889 Decree, supra note 69. 
83. Judge Hallett was “the ‘John Marshall’ of the Colorado legal system.” Romero, 
II, supra note 2, at 521 (quoting Golding Fairfield, The Original “Rush to the Rockies,” 
36 DICTA 131, 138 (1959)). Hallett came to Colorado in 1860 as part of the gold rush, 
and was appointed Chief Justice of the Colorado Territorial Supreme Court in 1866. John 
L. Kane, Jr., Moses Hallett, COLO. LAW., July 1998, at 17. President Andrew Johnson 
appointed Hallett Chief Justice at the request of the territorial legislature, which wanted a 
judge familiar with local mining and irrigation issues and specifically requested that 
Hallett be appointed. Id. As Chief Justice, Hallett lived in Pueblo and rode a circuit that 
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successors and the parciantes on the original Rio Culebra acequias fought 
over whether the decrees were valid, how they should be interpreted, and 
whether or how Colorado water officials could enforce them.
84
 
Today, Freehold no longer exists, and the status of the water rights 
it acquired through the Hallett Decrees is unclear. In spite of Freehold 
and its successors’ efforts to attract European and Anglo farmers to the 
Costilla Estate, the communities on the Rio Culebra have remained 
primarily Hispanic.
85
 Today, approximately 240 families irrigate more 
than 24,000 acres of land in the Rio Culebra watershed, many using 
traditional acequia irrigation practices.
86
 These families continue to grow 
traditional crops such as heirloom potato, corn, and bean varieties that 
are adapted to the high altitude, dry climate, and short growing season on 
the Rio Culebra.
87
 Although Colorado courts have considered two major 
legal disputes concerning the effects of the Hallett Decrees, many issues 
surrounding the Decrees remain unresolved, and the Hallett Decrees 
continue to cast a shadow of doubt over the status of water rights on the 
Rio Culebra. 
Before this Part turns to an examination of the Hallett Decrees and 
their effects, the following Section provides necessary background on 
Colorado water law and describes the event that sparked the litigation 
that led to the Hallett Decrees: the original 1889 adjudication of water 
rights on the Rio Culebra. 
  
 
included the San Luis Valley, where Hispanic residents knew him as “el juez severo,” or, 
“the strict judge.” Id. at 18. When Colorado became a state in 1876, President Grant 
appointed Hallett as the first federal district judge for the District of Colorado, a position 
in which he served until 1906. Id. Hallett also served as the first dean of the University of 
Colorado Law School. Id. at 19.  
84. See discussion infra of Vigil v. Swanson in Part III.A. 
85. See 2010 Census Data, supra note 11. 
86. See Rio Culebra Cooperative, Our Traditions: Acequias, 
http://www.rioculebra.com/acequias.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2014). 
87. Hicks & Peña, supra note 4, at 189. 
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B. Colorado Water Law and the 1889 General Stream 
Adjudication 
In Colorado, a water right is created by diverting and beneficially 
using unappropriated water.
88
 A water right cannot be enforced until it 
has been adjudicated in state water court.
89
 In an adjudication, the court 
considers evidence regarding when water use began and how much water 
has been used, and enters a decree that establishes both the amount of 
water available under a water right and the right’s priority in the relevant 
stream system.
90
 Once the water court enters the decree, state officials 
use the information in the decree to administer water to users.
91
 
Colorado’s General Assembly first created a comprehensive system 
for adjudicating water rights in the Adjudication Acts of 1879 and 
1881.
92
 The Adjudication Acts divided Colorado into water districts and 
 
88. Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 449-50 (1882) (seminal case 
upholding “prior appropriation” as the governing doctrine for water allocation in 
Colorado). 
89. Concerning Application for Water Rights of Turkey Canon Ranch Ltd. Liab. 
Co., 937 P.2d 739, 749 (Colo. 1997) (“The actual award of a decree, or formal 
adjudication of the water right, is therefore generally a condition precedent to any effort 
to enforce that right by calling out a junior user.”); see also Empire Lodge Homeowners’ 
Ass’n v. Moyer, 39 P.3d 1139, 1149 (Colo. 2001) (“Colorado early recognized the 
interlocking nature of appropriation, adjudication, and administration. The 1879 and 1881 
Acts provided for courts to adjudicate irrigation water rights and the water officials to 
administer them in priority. The 1903 Act provided for the adjudication and 
administration of rights and their priorities for all beneficial uses, not just irrigation. The 
1919 Act required adjudication of water rights; if not adjudicated, they were deemed 
abandoned. The 1943 Act provided for original and supplemental adjudications for water 
rights to be brought in the district court where the water diversions were located. The 
purpose of each of these acts was to make clear that adjudication was required in order to 
obtain the benefits of priority administration” (citations omitted)).  
90. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-304(7) (2014) (“The judgment and decree shall give 
the names of the applicants with respect to each water right or conditional water right 
involved, the location of the point of diversion or place of storage, the means of 
diversion, the type of use, the amount and priority, and other pertinent information.”). 
91. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-501(1) (2014) (“The state engineer and the division 
engineers shall administer, distribute, and regulate the waters of the state in accordance 
with the constitution of the state of Colorado, the provisions of this article and other 
applicable laws, and written instructions and orders of the state engineer, in conformity 
with such constitution and laws.”). 
92. Act of Feb. 19, 1879, § 19, 1879 Colo. Sess. Laws 94; Act of Feb. 23, 1881, § 1, 
1881 Colo. Sess. Laws 142. The system of adjudication created by the Adjudication Acts 
is no longer in place, having been replaced by the enactment of the Water Rights 
Determination and Administration Act in 1969. Water Right Determination and 
Administration Act of 1969, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-92-101 to -602 (2014). However, 
because all adjudications relevant to the Hallett Decrees took place prior to 1969, the 
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granted state district courts jurisdiction over water-rights adjudications.
93
 
To adjudicate a water right under the 1881 Adjudication Act, a water 
user filed a claim in the district court associated with the water district 
where he used water.
94
 Filing such a claim triggered a “general 
adjudication” in which all previously un-adjudicated claims for water 
rights in the water district were determined simultaneously.
95
 All water 
users in the district received notice of the adjudication and were joined in 
the case.
96
 The district court evaluated the claim of each water user who 
appeared and entered a single decree laying out the amount and priority 
of each user’s water right.
97
 If a water user did not participate in a 
general adjudication, the user’s right was not adjudicated or included in 
the decree and remained unenforceable.
98
 In 1905, the General Assembly 
passed a law providing for supplementary water rights adjudications in 
which water rights that were not adjudicated in water districts’ original 
general adjudications could be claimed and decreed.
99
 
In addition to setting a water right’s amount and priority, decrees 
from original and supplemental adjudications also describe the location 
where water is diverted from the natural stream, usually the type of use 
to which the water is put, and sometimes the location where or the 
 
adjudication system created by the Adjudication Acts is the system most relevant to this 
article. 
93. Act of Feb. 19, 1879, § 19, 1879 Colo. Sess. Laws 94, 99; Act of Feb. 23, 1881, 
§ 1, 1881 Colo. Sess. Laws 142.   
94. Act of Feb. 23, 1881, § 1, 1881 Colo. Sess. Laws 142. 
95. O’Neill v. N. Colorado Irr. Co., 139 P. 536, 537 (1914), aff’d, 242 U.S. 20 
(1916) (“The 1879 and 1881 irrigation statutes divide the natural streams of the state into 
units, called water districts, and provide for obtaining a general adjudication decree in 
each district settling the priorities of all the ditches in the district, and create the office of 
water commissioner in each district, and make it his duty to distribute the water to the 
ditches of the district according to the decreed priorities.”). Though the filing of a claim 
triggered a general adjudication, there could be significant delay between when a claim 
was filed and when a general adjudication took place. See, e.g., Deed from Costilla Estate 
Co. to San Luis Power and Water (Apr. 15, 1909), in COSTILLA COUNTY, COLORADO, 
RECORD BOOK 74, at 365 (County Recorder’s Office, San Luis, Colorado) (showing that 
filings were made for water rightrights for the Sanchez Reservoir System in 1908 and 
1909) [hereinafter Deed from Costilla Estate Co. to San Luis Power]; see also In the 
Matter of the Adjudication of Priorities of Water Rights for Irrigation, Power, Seepage 
Rights, Domestic Rights, and Reservoir Storage Purposes in Water Dist. No. 24, of the 
State of Colorado, No. 885 (Costilla Cnty. Dist. Ct., Feb. 11, 1935) (showing that the 
claimed rights were not adjudicated until 1935) [hereinafter 1935 Decree].   
96. Act of Feb. 23, 1881, § 26, 35, 1881 Colo. Sess. Laws 142, 156, 160. 
97. Id.   
98. Nichols v. McIntosh, 34 P. 278, 280–81 (Colo. 1893). 
99. Act of Apr. 10, 1905, ch. 111, § 2, 1905 Colo. Sess. Laws 243. 
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number of acres on which the water is used.
100
 A water right’s place of 
diversion, place of use, or type of use may all be changed, but such 
changes have required court approval since 1899.
101
 In addition to being 
changed, water rights may be sold, either in combination with, or 
separately from, the land with which they are associated.
102
 
The original general adjudication of water rights in Colorado’s 
Water District 24 took place in the late 1880s,
103
 with the Costilla 
County District Court issuing its final decree on June 14, 1889.
104
 The 
decree awarded water rights to parciantes on the original Rio Culebra 
acequias, listed in Table 1 below, with most acequias receiving a right to 
use one cubic foot per second (“cfs”) of water for each forty acres 
“cultivated under and irrigated from” the acequia.
105
 Although Freehold 
owned the Costilla Estate (and thus much of the land on the Rio Culebra) 
at the time of the 1889 adjudication, it did not claim and was not decreed 
rights to a significant amount of water.
106
 Freehold only appears in the 
1889 decree as one of thirteen claimants on the Montez Ditch, which 






100. JAMES N. CORBRIDGE JR. & TERESA A. RICE, VRANESH’S COLORADO WATER 
LAW 234–35 (rev. ed. 2006). 
101. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-305(3) (2014); Act of Apr. 6, 1899, § 1, 1899 
Colo. Sess. Laws 235, 235-36. 
102. Arnold v. Roup, 157 P. 206, 210 (Colo. 1916). A document conveying land 
can convey water rights without expressly mentioning them, but only if the water rights 
are considered appurtenant to the land. CORBRIDGE & RICE, supra note 100, at 239. 
Appurtenance depends on the intent of the grantor as determined by the circumstances 
surrounding the conveyance, including whether the water rights have historically been 
used on the conveyed land and whether water rights are necessary for beneficial use and 
enjoyment of the land. Id. at 240–42.  
103. 1889 Decree, supra note 69. Water District 24 encompasses the Rio Culebra in 
addition to the Rio Grande and its tributaries. Id. at 7. 
104. Id.  
105. See id. at 1–30. The 1889 decree lists the names of the parciantes who used 
water on each of the acequias that were granted water rights under the decree. Id. It is not 
clear if all of these parciantes were original settlers who held deeds from Beaubien. It is 
possible that some of them may have arrived in the Rio Culebra watershed after Beaubien 
sold the Sangre de Cristo Grant in 1864 and before the 1889 original adjudication. Others 
may have arrived before Beaubien sold the Sangre de Cristo Grant but may not have 
received deeds from Beaubien. If the parciantes did not hold deeds from Beaubien, 
Freehold arguably owned the land that the parciantes obtained water rights by irrigating.  
106. See id.  
107. Id. at 11. 
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Table 1: Water rights decreed to various acequias in 1889 









Acres per 1 
cfs 
San Luis People’s 23.00 900 39.13 
San Pedro 19.50 780 40 
Montez 1.00 12 12 
Vallejos 17.00 670 39.41 
San Acacio 46.00 1,850 40.21 
Cerro 40.00 1,586 39.65 
Francisco 
Sanchez 
12.50 490 38.4 
Mestas 4.50 170 37.78 
San Francisco 16.00 637 39.81 
Little Rock 1.00 21 21 
Torcido 1.00 33 33 
Abundo Martin 3.50 138 39.43 
Guadalupe Vigil 4.00 167 41.75 
J. M. J. Maez 1.50 60 40 
Pando 1.25 50 40 
Guadalupe 
Sanchez 
5.25 207 39.43 
 
C. The Hallett Decrees 
Although Freehold did not seek significant water rights of its own in 
the 1889 adjudication, it apparently perceived the rights the 1889 Decree 
awarded to the original Culebra acequias as a threat. Soon after the 1889 
Decree was issued, the company sought to prevent the parciantes on the 
original acequias from exercising their decreed water rights. On June 19, 
1890, Freehold filed eleven complaints against the parciantes in the 
United States Circuit Court for the District of Colorado.
109
 This Section 
 
108. Id. at 6–7. 
109. Complaint, Vigil v. Swanson, supra note 80, at 4. In these suits, Freehold was 
represented by Charles J. Hughes, Jr. Hallett Decrees, supra note 7. Hughes was a 
prominent Denver lawyer, representing high profile clients including “David Moffat’s 
The First National Bank of Denver, the International Trust Company, The Denver Union 
Water Company, Denver Tramway, the Adolph Coors Company, the Great Western 
Sugar Company . . . [and] several railroads.” Eli Wald, The Other Legal Profession and 
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relates how these complaints led to the entrance of the Hallett Decrees. 
Part III, below, addresses the meaning and validity of the Decrees. 
In its complaints, Freehold asserted that it held water rights in the 
Rio Culebra because: (1) such rights were conveyed by the Mexican 
government along with the Sangre de Cristo Grant, or by the U.S. 
government as a result of its confirmation of the Grant; and (2) it owned 
riparian land along the Culebra.
110
 Freehold also alleged that the 
parciantes had no right to use water from the Culebra, and that the 
amounts of water the parciantes claimed under the 1889 Decree were 
more than the parciantes needed or had ever actually used.
111
 As a 
remedy, Freehold sought to enjoin the parciantes from using water from 
the Culebra and its tributaries unless the parciantes could prove that they 
had a legal right to use the water.
112
 
The parciantes objected to Freehold’s complaints, arguing that 
Freehold had failed to state a cause of action because it failed to 
demonstrate that it had water rights superior to those held by the 
parciantes, or any water rights at all.
113
 The parciantes also argued that 
the federal circuit court did not have jurisdiction to decide the case 
because Colorado state courts have exclusive jurisdiction over state-
based water rights cases.
114
 On January 14, 1898, the Circuit Court for 
the District of Colorado upheld the parciantes’ demurrer and dismissed 
 
the Orthodox View of the Bar: The Rise of Colorado’s Elite Law Firms, 80 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 605, 645 (2009). In 1909, Hughes was elected to the United States Senate. Id.  
110. Complaint, U.S. Freehold Land & Emigration Co. v. Gallegos (C.C.D. Colo. 
June 19, 1890) (reproduced in its entirety in: Complaint, Vigil v. Swanson, supra note 
80). 
111. Id. At the time, advances in the science of irrigation engineering were driving 
policy changes, and likely Freehold was basing at least some of its claims on developing 
stadardized practices for irrigation in the West that attempted to reduce waste and 
encourage development and settlement. In his landmark 1903 book Irrigation 
Institutions, Elwood Mead points to the previously standard practice in Colorado courts 
of approving one cfs per 80 acres of land irrigated, and asserts that such decrees provided 
three to fifty times as much water as necessary for proper irrigation. ELWOOD MEAD, 
IRRIGATION INSTITUTIONS: A DISCUSSION OF THE ECONOMIC AND LEGAL QUESTIONS 
CREATED BY THE GROWTH OF IRRIGATED AGRICULTURE IN THE WEST 154 (1903). In light 
of this developing standardization, Gilpin and his associates likely felt that they were 
both behaving with generosity and were backed by a scientifically sound understanding 
of the needs of irrigators in Colorado when they sought a reduction of the parciantes’ 
1889 Decree rights. 
112. Complaint, U.S. Freehold Land & Emigration Co. v. Gallegos, supra note 110. 
113. Demurer, U.S. Freehold Land and Emigration Co. v. Gallegos (C.C.D. Colo. 
Aug. 2, 1890) (reproduced in: Complaint, Vigil v. Swanson, supra note 80). 
114. Id.  




 The Circuit Court’s rejection of Freehold’s 
arguments was significant enough that a number of Colorado newspapers 
reported on it.
116
 The Colorado Transcript stated that the decision was of 
“great importance” because it followed Colorado statutory law—which 
embraced prior appropriation—rather than the common law—which 
employed the riparian doctrine.
117
 
Freehold appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit, which reversed the Circuit Court’s dismissal and remanded the 
suits to the Circuit Court for trial.
118
 Before the trial took place, however, 
the parciantes reached settlement agreements with Freehold. 
Accordingly, the merits of Freehold’s claims for water rights were not 
evaluated.
119
 Under an early draft of the settlement agreement, the 
parciantes would have agreed to modify the 1889 Decree “by some 
appropriate proceedings” such that each acequia would be entitled to one 
cfs for each eighty acres irrigated, rather than one cfs for each forty acres 
 
115. Complaint, Vigil v. Swanson, supra note 80; U.S. Freehold Land & 
Emigration Co. v. Gallegos, 89 F. 769, 770 (8th Cir. 1898). 
116. E.g., Judge Riner Says Farmers Using Water Have Rights Superior to the 
Riparian Proprietors, SUMMIT CNTY. J. (Breckenridge), Jan. 22, 1898, at 7; Irrigation 
Decision, COLO. TRANSCRIPT (Golden), Jan. 19, 1898, at 2. 
117. Irrigation Decision, COLO. TRANSCRIPT (Golden), Jan. 19, 1898, at 2 (“The 
decision also establishes the principle that priority of appropriation is of greater effect in 
determining ownership than claims by virtue of riparian rights, the statutes of the state, 
rather than the common law, governing the question.”). Colorado courts had already 
established that prior appropriation, rather than the riparian doctrine, was the law in 
Colorado by the time of the Circuit Court’s decision. See Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 
6 Colo. 443 (1882). Accordingly, the perception that the Circuit Court’s decision was 
significant likely resulted from the fact that it, as a federal court, followed Colorado law 
in favoring prior appropriation. 
118. Freehold, 89 F. at 774.  
119. Although Freehold’s claims were never evaluated, at least one legal scholar 
argues that they were likely without merit. Gregory Hicks and Devon Peña note that the 
U.S. Supreme Court held in Boquillas Land & Cattle Co. v. Curtis, 213 U.S. 339 (1909) 
“that parties with confirmed land grants acquired water rights either under state or 
territorial law or retained water rights granted under the law of the predecessor 
sovereign,” but that congressional confirmation created no new water rights. Hicks & 
Peña, supra note 5, at 431–32 n.140. Because grants of riparian public domain lands did 
not convey water rights under Colorado law, and because Hicks and Peña interpret 
Mexican law as holding that grants of land did not include grants of water rights, Hicks 
and Peña argue that Freehold’s claims were based on “misapprehensions of law.” Id. 
Interestingly, Judge Moses Hallett, who approved the Hallett Decrees, served on the 
Colorado Territorial Supreme Court from 1866 to 1876 and was originally appointed to 
that court by President Andrew Johnson because he lived in Colorado and understood 
“the unique legal problems of mining and irrigation.” Kane, supra note 83, at 17. 
Accordingly, it is likely that Hallett was familiar with Colorado water law and prior 
appropriation.   




 The extra water would be “released and abandoned . . . 
turned back into the stream or streams from which it is taken, and . . . 
made subject to future appropriations by parties other than [the 
parciantes].”
121
 This language suggests that Freehold’s initial goal in the 
Hallett proceedings was not to obtain the parciantes’ water rights, but 
simply to free up water supplies by limiting the parciantes’ use of water. 
In the final agreement memorialized in the Hallett Decrees, however, the 
parciantes agreed to give the extra water to Freehold instead of 
abandoning it. As a result, under the settlement agreement, the parciantes 
granted Freehold a total of 91.1 cfs of the 197 cfs decreed to the original 
Rio Culebra acequias in 1889.
122
 On July 17, 1900, Judge Moses Hallett 
of the United States Circuit Court for the District of Colorado entered a 




As illustrated in Table 2, the Hallett Decrees allowed most of the 
acequias to retain one cfs of water for every eighty acres of land 
irrigated.
124
 The Hallett Decrees also revised the number of acres 




120. Draft Settlement Agreement (May 1900) (available at the Van Diest 
Collection, Tutt Library, Colorado College, Box 81, Bound Copybook 1) [hereinafter the 
Van Diest Collection]. 
121. Id. 
122. Complaint, Vigil v. Swanson, supra note 80, at 10–11. 
123. Hallett Decrees, supra note 7. The several decrees were essentially the same, 
with each decree laying out how much of its 1889 decreed water right a particular 
acequia granted to Freehold. Id. The decrees state that Freehold “is the owner by virtue of 
the premise and agreements of the parties hereto, and the stipulations filed by them 
herein, and by this decree, and entitled to take from the [particular river/stream] [  ] cubic 
feet per second of time of the waters flowing therein . . . being a portion of the waters 
heretofore decreed” to the Rio Culebra acequias by the 1889 Decree. Id. at 2. The decrees 
also say that the rights and claims of the parciantes “to all water acquired by them [under 
the 1889 Decree] by virtue of Priority No. [  ] over and above [the amount of water 
retained by each acequia] are, by the agreements of the parties and the stipulation herein, 
and by this decree, transferred, assigned, and set over to” Freehold. Id. The decrees stated 
that the portion of the 1889 rights retained by the parciantes would have a higher priority 
than those granted to Freehold. Id. at 3.  
124. Id. at 1–35; Complaint, Vigil v. Swanson, supra note 80, at 13–14. As shown 
in Table 1 above, the 1889 Decree granted most acequias approximately one cfs for every 
40 acres of irrigated land. The complaint in Vigil v. Swanson alleges that Freehold 
convinced the parciantes that one cfs was sufficient to irrigate 80 acres of land as part of 
Freehold’s efforts to induce the parciantes to agree to the settlement memorialized in the 
Hallett Decrees. Id. at 14.   
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Table 2: Amounts of water retained by parciantes and granted 








































23.00 13.50 9.5 900 1,080 80 
San Pedro 19.50 10.50 9.00 780 840 80 
Montez 1.00 .25 .75 12 12 48 
Vallejos 17.00 8.50 8.50 670 680 80 
San Acacio 46.00 23.25 22.75 1,850 1,860 80 
Cerro 40.00 22.50 17.50 1,586 1,800 80 
Francisco 
Sanchez 
12.50 6.25 6.25 490 500 80 
Mestas 4.50 2.25 2.25 170 180 80 
San 
Francisco 
16.00 10.00 6.00 637 800 80 
Little Rock 1.00 .25 .75 21 21 84 
Torcido 1.00 .50 .50 33 40 80 
Abundo 
Martin 
3.50 1.75 1.75 138 140 80 
Guadalupe 
Vigil 
4.00 2.50 1.50 167 200 80 
J. M. J. 
Maez 
1.50 .75 .75 60 60 80 
Pando 1.25 .65 .60 50 50 76.92 
Guadalupe 
Sanchez 
5.25 2.5 2.75 207 200 80 
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Why did the parciantes agree to give Freehold a large portion of 
their water rights? It is possible that the parciantes involved in the 
settlement negotiations felt, at the time, that the Hallett Decrees were 
strategic in that they provided certainty around issues of land and water 
rights over which they were having ongoing conflicts with Freehold.
125
 
Alternatively, Gregory Hicks and Devon Peña argue that the settlement 
memorialized in the Hallett Decrees may have resulted from Freehold’s 
influence over the committee that negotiated the settlement on behalf of 
the parciantes.
126
 This “citizens’ committee” consisted of William H. 
Meyer, A. A. Salazar, and Louis Cohn, all of whom were prominent 
merchants in Costilla County.
127
 Both Meyer and Salazar were friends of 
Edmund Van Diest, who was Freehold’s resident manager on the Costilla 
Estate at the time of the Hallett Decrees.
128
 
In the months leading up to the settlement, Van Diest took an active 
interest in the business of the merchants on the citizens’ committee and 
even proposed that they go into business with him. In February 1899 Van 
Diest sent a letter to Cohn, Salazar, and Meyer’s father Ferdinand, who 
was also a local merchant.
129
 The letter emphasized the risks that Van 
Diest perceived in extending too much credit to the merchants’ Hispanic 
customers.
130
 The following month, Van Diest sent William Meyer a 
copy of a “proposition” apparently meant for all local merchants, 
suggesting the consolidation of local general stores into a single 
 
125. First, is possible that the parciantes sought to avoid the expense and 
uncertainty of adjudicating the validity of their water rights in federal court. Though 
Freehold’s claim to hold water rights derived from the company’s ownership of the 
Costilla Estate was questionable at the time, and though later court decisions revealed it 
to be without merit, at the time of the Hallett Decrees such issues were not clearly settled. 
See supra note 119. Second, because Freehold disputed some parciantes’ title to the land 
the parciantes occupied, it could also be argued that the Hallett settlement was attractive 
to at least some parciantes because the settlement constituted an implicit recognition of 
their right to occupy their land. This argument is weakened, however, by the fact that 
Freehold and its successors sold land served by acequias affected by the Hallett Decrees 
to parciantes in the years after the Hallett Decrees. See infra Part II(d).  
126. Hicks & Peña, supra note 5, at 435–36.  
127. Id. 
128. Id. (citing Letter from Edmund Van Diest to W.H. Meyer (Dec. 7, 1903) 
(available at the Van Diest Collection, Box 82, Folder A)); Letter from Edmund Van 
Diest to Delfino Salazar (A. A. Salazar’s son) (Apr. 29, 1919) (available at the Van Diest 
Collection, Box 81, Bound Copybook 1). 
129. Hicks & Peña, supra note 5, at 435–36. (citing Letter from Edmund Van Diest 
to Fred Meyer (Feb. 23, 1899) (available at the Van Diest Collection, Box 83, Copybook 
of letters dated Dec. 13, 1898 through Sept. 3, 1899). 
130. See id. 




 The formerly independent merchants would own stock in, 
and be paid employees of, the new company.
132
 Van Diest argued that 
the consolidated business would benefit the merchants by allowing for 
“[r]eduction in credit business, and control of debtors,” as well as 
“cheaper buying, by the ability to buy in larger quantities.”
133
 He further 
noted that “[t]he tendency of all enterprise is to a concentration of 
effort,” because “in union there is strength,” and “every businessman 
does readily realize the benefits obtainable from the withdrawal of his 
neighbor’s competition.”
134
 The proposition closed by suggesting a 
meeting to discuss details, including “what stores will be allowed to 
come into the combination.”
135
 It is not clear whether the members of the 
citizens’ committee accepted Van Diest’s proposition, or, if they did, 
whether it influenced the committee’s actions in negotiating the Hallett 
settlement. It does appear, however, that Van Diest was attempting to 
align the committee’s interests with his own, and by extension, with 
those of Freehold. 
It is unclear whether the Hallett Decrees resulted in Freehold 
obtaining a legal right to use any water. The Decrees state that Freehold 
can take water from the Rio Culebra and its tributaries, but do not specify 
particular sites for diversion or use.
136
 At the time the Hallett Decrees 
were entered, as now, Colorado water rights were decreed for use 
through a specific diversion structure and in a specific location, and their 
place and manner of use could not be legally changed without approval 
by a state court.
137
 Accordingly, without court approval, Freehold could 
 
131. Letter from Edmund Van Diest to William H. Meyer (Mar. 23, 1899) 
(available at the Van Diest Collection, Box 81, Bound Copybook 1) (the letter itself does 
not show William H. Meyer’s name and is worded as if addressed to a group of people; 
the copybook index, however, indicates that the letter was sent to William H. Meyer).  




136. Hallett Decrees, supra note 7. 
137. Act of Apr. 6, 1899, § 1, 1899 Colo. Sess. Laws 235, 235-36; City of 
Englewood v. Burlington Ditch, Reservoir & Land Co., 235 P.3d 1061, 1068 (Colo. 
2010). (“The right to change the use of a water right is an important stick in the bundle of 
rights that constitute a Colorado water right. It is not, however, absolute, as it must be 
balanced against the competing interests of other holders of vested water rights, including 
their right to ‘the continuation of stream conditions as they existed at the time they first 
made their appropriation.’ Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. City of Golden, 44 P.3d 
241, 245 (Colo. 2002). As such, changes in water rights cannot be made ‘in any manner 
other than through judicial approval, following statutorily authorized procedures.’ Fort 
Lyon Canal Co. v. Catlin Canal Co., 642 P.2d 501, 506 (Colo. 1982) (citations 
omitted).”). 
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not legally use the Freehold Interests at locations other than the acequias 
to which the Interests were originally decreed. Some of the possible 
solutions to this issue are addressed in Parts IV and V, below. The 
following two Sections, however, examine how the Freehold Interests 
were used in the years following the Hallett Decrees. 
D. The 1905 District 24 Supplemental Adjudication 
In 1905, the Colorado District Court for Costilla County conducted 
a supplemental adjudication to determine previously unadjudicated water 
rights on the Rio Culebra.
138
 This Section examines some of the claims 
and assertions made by various parties to the 1905 adjudication in order 
to shed light on how the Freehold Interests were used in the years 
following the Hallett Decrees. Although none of the Freehold Interests 
were directly at issue in the 1905 adjudication, evidence introduced in 
the adjudication suggests that in the years following the Hallett Decrees 
Freehold and its successor leased and sold small portions of the Freehold 
Interests. In general, however, the 1905 adjudication demonstrates that 
Freehold and its successors thought they possessed power to grant the 
right to use water regardless of whether they owned adjudicated water 
rights, and likely did not believe that they were transferring portions of 
the Freehold Interests every time they purported to grant someone the 
right to use water. 
As of 1902, Freehold had been unable to realize the majority of its 
development ambitions. Although the company had made plans to 
construct a water storage and distribution system soon after acquiring the 
Freehold Interests, its plans were thwarted, at least in part by a series of 
dry years.
139
 Freehold had also failed to attract significant numbers of 
immigrants to the Costilla Estate.
140
 In debt and unable to make money 
by selling parcels to immigrants, Freehold sold the entire Estate to the 
Costilla Land Investment Company (“Costilla Investment”) in 1902.
141
 
The conveyances through which Costilla Investment obtained the 
 
138. Decree, In the Matter of the Adjudication of the Priorities of Right to the Use 
of Water for Irrigating and Other Purposes in Water Dist. No. 24, No. 536 (Costilla Cnty. 
Dist. Ct., Dec. 14, 1905) [hereinafter 1905 Decree]. 
139. Hicks & Peña, supra note 5, at 437. 
140. BRAYER, supra note 34, at 123. 
141. Warranty deed from Freehold to Harry C. Watt (Aug. 7, 1902), in COSTILLA 
COUNTY, COLORADO, RECORD BOOK 43, at 453 (County Recorder’s Office, San Luis, 
Colorado) (conveying Colorado portion of the Costilla Estate); Quit-Claim Deed from 
Harry C. Watt to Costilla Investment (Aug. 26,1903), in COSTILLA COUNTY, COLORADO, 
RECORD BOOK 46, at 106 (County Recorder’s Office, San Luis, Colorado) (conveying 
Colorado portion of the Costilla Estate).  
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Costilla Investment did not file any claims for water rights in the 
1905 adjudication, but did participate, offering evidence and 
testimony.
143
 Some of the claims filed in the adjudication indicate that 
Costilla Investment was selling small portions of the Freehold Interests. 
The San Luis People’s Ditch introduced a deed, executed in May of 
1905, from Costilla Investment to J. M. Salazar for 189 acres of land 
lying under the San Luis People’s Ditch.
144
 In addition to land, the deed 
conveyed 1.6 cfs of water from the Rio Culebra “such water being in 
recognition of and not a conveyance in addition to the water rights 
belonging to the above described land, under [the Hallett Decrees].”
145
 
The San Luis People’s Ditch claimants stated that the land conveyed to 
Salazar by the deed was the only land that Costilla Investment had 
owned along the San Luis People’s Ditch.
146
 The Vallejos ditch also 
claimed additional water based on deeds from Costilla Investment and 
Freehold conveying land and the right to use water on that land.
147
 
Accordingly, Freehold and Costilla Investment may have sold small 
portions of the Freehold Interests. In addition to selling portions of the 
 
142. Warranty deed from Freehold to Harry C. Watt (Aug. 7, 1902), in COSTILLA 
COUNTY, COLORADO, RECORD BOOK 43, at 453 (County Recorder’s Office, San Luis, 
Colorado) (conveying Colorado portion of the Costilla Estate); Quit-Claim Deed from 
Harry C. Watt to Costilla Investment (Aug. 26,1903), in COSTILLA COUNTY, COLORADO, 
RECORD BOOK 46, at 106 (County Recorder’s Office, San Luis, Colorado) (conveying 
Colorado portion of the Costilla Estate).  
143. Transcript of Evidence Offered Generally, In the Matter of the Adjudication of 
the Priorities of Right to the Use of Water for Irrigating and Other Purposes in Water 
Dist. No. 24, No. 536, at 5–9 (Costilla Cnty. Dist. Ct., Dec. 14, 1905) [hereinafter 
Transcript of Evidence 1905]. 
144. Abstract of Evidence at 106, 109–10, In the Matter of the Adjudication of the 
Priorities of Right to the Use of Water for Irrigating and Other Purposes in Water Dist. 
No. 24, No. 536 (Costilla Cnty. Dist. Ct., Dec. 14, 1905) [hereinafter Abstract of 
Evidence]. 
145. Id. at 109–10. It is not clear whether the water right referred to in the deed is 
part of the water right left to the parciantes under the Hallett decree or part of the water 
right granted to Freehold. The fact that Costilla Investment was Freehold’s successor and 
was conveying the water right suggests that the water right in the deed was a part of the 
right Freehold obtained through the Hallett Decrees and subsequently sold to Costilla 
Investment. However, the fact that the deed characterizes the water right as “belonging to 
the above described land” could suggest that the right was a portion of the rights the 
Hallett Decrees left to the parciantes. The Hallett Decrees do not describe any particular 
land that Freehold’s rights are to be used on, but do describe land that the parciantes are 
“entitled” to apply their water to. Hallett Decrees, supra note 7, at 2. 
146. Abstract of Evidence, supra note 151, at 106. 
147. Id. at 106, 109–10, 164. 
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Freehold Interests, Freehold and Costilla Investment also may have been 
leasing them. One issue disputed in the adjudication proceedings was 
whether or not Freehold or Costilla Investment had ever put the Freehold 
Interests to use.
148
 A. A. Salazar, who claimed to have lived on the Rio 
Culebra for over forty years (and who had served as a member of the 
citizens’ committee that negotiated the Hallett Decrees for the 
parciantes), testified that Freehold and Costilla Investment had never 
constructed any irrigation ditches or applied any water to District 24 
land.
149
 Costilla Investment did not contest that it had not constructed 
any ditches or diverted any water itself, but claimed to be using the 
Freehold Interests “through its tenants.”
150
 As evidence, Costilla 
Investment introduced sixty-seven leases of agricultural land on the 
Culebra between itself or Freehold and third parties.
151
 Some of these 
leases granted the lessee the right to use specified amounts of water from 
the Culebra and its tributaries, but none of them mentioned the 1889 
Decree or the Hallett Decrees, or specified particular diversion structures 
that water was to be taken through.
152
 In fact, all of the leases examined 
for this Article that explicitly granted the right to take water from the 
Culebra and its tributaries were issued prior to the entry of the Hallett 
Decrees, at a time when Freehold held no adjudicated water rights apart 
from a portion of the one cfs decreed to the Montez Ditch.
153
 
Accordingly, while Costilla Investment claimed that it was using the 
Freehold Interests through its tenants, the company apparently did not 
take pains to document its use of the Freehold Interests in its leases. 
Indeed, the company’s leasing practices suggest that the company 
thought it had the authority to grant its lessees the right to use water 
regardless of whether it possessed any adjudicated water rights. 
 
148. Transcript of Evidence 1905 at 2, 14. 
149. Id. at 2.  
150. Id. at 14. 
151. Transcript of Evidence 1905, supra note 143, at 5; Abstract of Evidence at 
181. 
152. Abstract of Evidence, supra note 151, at 181–84. Sixteen of the sixty-seven 
leases were reviewed for this Article. All sixteen leases were made between 1900 and 
1904 and had terms of three to five years. Id. Four of the sixteen leases specifically 
included water for the irrigation of the leased land on the basis of one cfs per 80 acres. Id. 
These leases do not specify particular acequias from which the water was to be taken. Id. 
Twelve of the sixteen leases do not mention water, but state that the land is leased for 
“agricultural purposes.” Id. All of the leases that mention water were executed prior to 
the entrance of the Hallett Decrees on July 17, 1900. Id. All of the leases that do not 
mention water were executed after the entrance of the Hallett Decrees. Id. It is not clear 
whether this is merely a coincidence, or if Freehold’s lease writing practices changed as a 
result of the Hallett Decrees.  
153. Id.; see 1889 Decree, supra note 69. 
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In general, it appears that no one was paying close attention to legal 
niceties such as who had the power to create water rights or where the 
water rights that Freehold or Costilla Investment purported to be granting 
were coming from. In giving testimony in support of the application of 
the Eastdale Reservoir Number 1 to take water from the Culebra, a 
trustee of the reservoir company stated that Freehold had agreed to allow 
the reservoir company to take twenty cfs from the Culebra outside of 
irrigation season.
154
 The examining lawyer asked the trustee whether this 
water was “to be taken from the water that [Freehold] claim[s] to be 
decreed to them by the United States Court,” and the trustee replied, 
“they don’t say what water.”
155
 Though the trustee went on to say that he 
believed Freehold had already appropriated the water it agreed to let the 
reservoir company use,
156
 the 1905 decree granted the reservoir company 
the right to take water from the Culebra under new, junior priorities, 
demonstrating that the court treated the diversions as new appropriations 
rather than as transfers of the Freehold Interests.
157
 
The claims and testimony offered in the 1905 adjudication indicate 
that up until at least 1905, Freehold and Costilla Investment did not build 
diversion structures or directly put any of the Freehold Interests to use.
158
 
Instead, the companies used the Freehold Interests as the basis for 
granting their lessees and grantees rights to use water from the Rio 
Culebra watershed.
159
 However, Freehold granted rights to use water 
from the Culebra prior to the Hallett Decrees,
160
 and Costilla Investment 
appears to have believed that it was improper for the state to decree 
water rights to Costilla Estate water users unless Costilla Investment had 
first deeded such users the right to use water.
161
 These facts indicate that 
the companies thought they possessed power to grant rights to water 
 
154. Transcript of Testimony Offered for Eastdale No. 1 Ditch and Reservoir at 2, 
18, In the Matter of the Adjudication of the Priorities of Right to the Use of Water for 
Irrigating and Other Purposes in Water Dist. No. 24, No. 536 (Costilla Cnty. Dist. Ct., 
Dec. 14, 1905). 
155. Id. at 18. 
156. Id. 
157. 1905 Decree, supra note 138, at 35–36. 
158. Transcript of Evidence 1905, supra note 143, at 4–5. 
159. Id. at 14. 
160. See Abstract of Evidence, supra note 151, at 164–73. 
161. Memorandum itemizing Costilla Investment’s objections to the 1905 Decree 
(Nov. 11, 1907) (available at the Van Diest Collection, Box 50, Folder 325) (Asserting 
that the Antonio Valdez Ditch should have been awarded one cfs rather than three and 
19/80 cfs because the company had granted two claimants a total of one cfs, and the other 
claimants were only lessees. Also, objecting to the Aban Sanchez Ditch being decreed 
one and 21/30 cfs because all of the water used by the ditch was “used on company 
ground; some by renters, some by squatters”). 
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from the Rio Culebra system even if they did not possess any adjudicated 
water rights, perhaps as a consequence of their ownership of the Costilla 
Estate. Accordingly, Freehold and Costilla Investment likely did not 
believe they were transferring a portion of the Freehold Interests every 
time they granted someone the right to use water. In addition, because 
Colorado water rights may only be used at their decreed place of use and 
through their decreed point of diversion,
162
 where Freehold and Costilla 
Investment granted or leased the right to use water on lands that could 
not be irrigated by the Hallett acequias, the companies could not have 
been granting or leasing the Freehold Interests. 
Thus, the 1905 adjudication indicates that Costilla Investment likely 
was using at least some of the Freehold Interests through its tenants, and 
had transferred other portions of the Interests through land sales. Part V, 
below, discusses the implications of leases and deeds granted by 
Freehold and Costilla Investment for the current legal status of the 
Freehold Interests. The next Section discusses the construction of an 
extensive water storage and distribution system on the Costilla Estate and 
an attempt to utilize the Freehold Interests to supply water for the 
system. 
E. The Sanchez Reservoir System 
After the 1905 adjudication, momentum toward development began 
to build again, and plans to construct an extensive water storage and 
distribution system in the Culebra watershed finally came to fruition with 
the construction of the Sanchez Reservoir System.
163
 In 1908, Costilla 
Investment transferred the Costilla Estate and all of its water rights to yet 
another company—the Costilla Estate Development Company (“Costilla 
Estate Co.”).
164
 Costilla Estate Co. recorded deeds with the State 
 
162. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-304(7) (2014); COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-
501(1) (2014).  
163. The Sanchez system consists of the following structures: The Culebra-Sanchez 
Canal, the Sanchez Reservoir, the Culebra-Eastdale Canal, the Eastdale No. 1 Reservoir, 
the Eastdale No. 2 Reservoir, the Culebra-Cerritos Canal, the Cerritos Reservoir, the 
Romero Ditch, and the Mesita Reservoir.  
164. Quit-claim deed from Costilla Investment to Franklin Brooks (Nov. 11 1908), 
in COSTILLA COUNTY, COLORADO, RECORD BOOK 55, at 164 (County Recorder’s Office, 
San Luis, Colorado) (conveying entire Costilla Estate and “all water rights, water 
privileges, appropriations, priorities, adjudications, ditches, canals, laterals and water 
privileges of every kind or nature whatsoever, thereon situate, thereto belonging, 
appendant or appurtenant, or therewith used and enjoyed”); Quit-claim Deed from 
Franklin Brooks to Costilla Estate Co. (Dec. 19, 1908), in COSTILLA COUNTY, COLORADO, 
RECORD BOOK 55, at 164 (County Recorder’s Office, San Luis, Colorado) (conveying the 
same). 
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Engineer for most of the major elements of the Sanchez system in 1908 
and 1909,
165
 and the construction of the majority of the system was 
completed between 1907 and 1912.
166
 
The Sanchez System was designed to take water from the Rio 
Culebra and its tributaries and transport it to the Sanchez Reservoir 
through a feeder ditch known as the Culebra-Sanchez Canal.
167
 Water 
would be stored in Sanchez Reservoir until needed and then released 
back into the Rio Culebra.
168
 The released water would be transported 
downstream by the Culebra and then re-diverted into various distribution 
ditches.
169
 Water diverted into the distribution ditches would be used by 




The construction of the Sanchez System was part of a new wave of 
investment, optimism, and boosterism regarding the Costilla Estate.
171
 
Costilla Estate Co. was one of a group of companies “capitalized . . . for 
a total of $10,000,000” that would use the “abundant water supply” of 
the Estate to provide water and power to the surrounding area, allowing 
development of “800,000 acres of agricultural land” both within and 
outside of the Estate.
172
 In addition, a railroad through the Costilla Estate 
that would “open[] vast territory” was planned.
173
 Unsurprisingly, 
renewed conflict over water followed close on the heels of this renewed 
interest in development. 
By the time the Sanchez System was complete, Costilla Estate Co. 
had sold the water rights it obtained through its purchase of the Costilla 
Estate to the San Luis Power and Water Company (“San Luis 
 
165. Deed from Costilla Estate Co. to San Luis Power and Water, supra note 95, at 
365 (conveying water rights and infrastructure, including most major elements of the 
Sanchez system). 
166. Statement of Claim for the Sanchez System of Reservoirs and Ditches, In the 
Matter of the Adjudication of the Priorities of Water Rights in Water Dist. No. 24, No. 
885 (Costilla Cnty. Dist. Ct., May 21, 1926) [hereinafter Sanchez Statement of Claim]; 
Transcript of Evidence at 49, In the Matter of the Adjudication of the Priorities of Water 
Rights in Water Dist. No. 24, No. 885 ( Costilla Cnty. Dist. Ct., Feb. 11, 1935) 
[hereinafter Transcript of Evidence 1935]. 




171. See, e.g., Railway for Costilla Grant, KIOWA CNTY. PRESS (Eads), July. 9, 
1909, at 1. 
172. Id.  
173. Id. 




 San Luis Power apparently convinced the Division Engineer 
and Water Commissioner responsible for distributing water on the Rio 
Culebra to allow it to divert the entire 91.1 cfs granted to Freehold under 
the Hallett Decrees into the Sanchez System through the Culebra-
Sanchez Canal.
175
 It was most likely this action that sparked the next 
round in the legal fight to control the waters of the Rio Culebra—a 1914 
suit filed in the Costilla County District Court by parciantes on the 
original acequias captioned Vigil v. Swanson.
176
 In ruling on the 
parciantes claims in the case, the Vigil court was required to interpret the 
meaning of the Hallett Decrees. 
III. THE MEANING OF THE HALLETT DECREES 
Since their inception, the Hallett Decrees have created confusion in 
the Rio Culebra community. This Part chronicles the community’s 
attempts to interpret the meaning and effects of the Decrees, from Vigil v. 
Swanson, in which a Colorado court explained the Decrees’ legal effect, 
to the 1984 Abandonment Proceedings that ended in further confusion. 
This Part also describes the type of ownership interests created by the 
Hallett Decrees and explains the results of a title search conducted by the 




174. Quit-claim Deed from Costilla Investment to Franklin Brooks (Nov. 11, 1908), 
in COSTILLA COUNTY, COLORADO, RECORD BOOK 55, at 164 (County Recorder’s Office, 
San Luis, Colorado) (conveying entire Costilla Estate and “all water rights, water 
privileges, appropriations, priorities, adjudications, ditches, canals, laterals and water 
privileges of every kind or nature whatsoever, thereon situate, thereto belonging, 
appendant or appurtenant, or therewith used and enjoyed”); Quit-claim Deed from 
Franklin Brooks to Costilla Estate Development Corporation (“Costilla Estate Co.”) 
(Dec. 19, 1908), in COSTILLA COUNTY, COLORADO, RECORD BOOK 55, at 164 (County 
Recorder’s Office, San Luis, Colorado) (conveying the same); Deed from Costilla Estate 
Co. to San Luis Power, supra note 95 (conveying all rights to the surface and ground 
water of the Costilla Estate that Costilla Estate Co. possessed as the successor of Charles 
Beaubien, including Costilla Estate Co.’s rights as “riparian proprietor” or “owners of the 
watershed or drainage area,” and also conveying the Sanchez reservoir system and “the 
waters therein stored and to be stored and therein flowing and to flow and all rights of 
any kind or nature in and to the same according to all and every the adjudicated priorities 
thereof or appropriations thereon under any decrees or title”). 
175. See Order Findings and Decree, Vigil v. Swanson, at 3 (Costilla Cnty. Dist. 
Ct., Mar. 26, 1917) [hereinafter Order Findings and Decree].  
176. Complaint, Vigil v. Swanson, supra note 80. 
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A. Vigil v. Swanson and the Legal Effect of the Hallett Decrees 
In Vigil v. Swanson, a group of Costilla County parciantes (the 
majority of whom were parciantes of the original Culebra acequias) sued 
the Colorado Division Engineer and Water Commissioner for Water 
District 24, seeking to enjoin them from enforcing the Hallett Decrees.
177
 
The plaintiff parciantes claimed that San Luis Power had convinced the 
Engineer and Commissioner to rely on the Hallett Decrees in 
administering the waters of District 24 rather than distributing water in 
accordance with the existing Costilla County District Court decrees.
178
 
The plaintiff parciantes asked the court to enjoin the Engineer and 
Commissioner from enforcing the Hallett Decrees, and to force the 
Engineer and Commissioner to administer District 24 only in accordance 
with the 1889 and 1905 state decrees.
179
 The plaintiff parciantes argued 
that the Hallett Decrees were invalid because the U.S. Circuit Court for 
the District of Colorado lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to enter 
decrees concerning Colorado water rights.
180
 They also asserted that 
even if the Hallett Decrees were valid, the decrees only gave Freehold 
the right to appropriate water and seek an adjudicated water right under 
Colorado law, which neither Freehold nor its successors had done.
181
 It 
appears that the parciantes’ goal was to regain control of the Freehold 
Interests, or at least to force San Luis Power to obtain a Colorado state 
decree before the company could use the Interests in the Sanchez 
Reservoir System. 
The Vigil court entered its opinion on March 26, 1917.
182
 The court 
held that the Hallett Decrees “were valid and binding adjudications 
between the parties thereto, and their successors in interest,”
183
 but that 
the Engineer and Commissioner had “no right to regard any decree, save 
the decrees of this court entered for that especial purpose, in the 
 
177. Id.; 1889 Decree, supra note 69. 
178. Complaint, Vigil v. Swanson, supra note 80, at 15–16 (stating that San Luis 
Power had filed copies of the Hallett Decrees with the Costilla County Recorder and 
District Court and had convinced the Water Commissioner “to recognize [the Hallett 
Decrees] as binding and lawful adjudications of priorities to the use of water in said 
Water District 24”).  
179. Id. at 24–25. 
180. Id. at 14–15. 
181. Id. at 14–16, 22. Though the plaintiff parciantes alleged that San Luis Power 
and its predecessors had never put water to use or constructed diversion works, evidence 
submitted to obtain water rights for the Sanchez Reservoir system indicates that the 
system had been constructed and was in use by 1912, two years before the parciantes 
filed their complaint in Vigil. Transcript of Evidence 1935, supra note 166, at 49.  
182. Order Findings and Decree, supra note 175.  
183. Id. at 3. 
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distribution of the waters of . . . district 24.”
184
 The court also found that 
San Luis Power had “wrongfully persuaded” the Engineer and 
Commissioner to deliver the Freehold Interests at the head gate of the 
Culebra-Sanchez Canal, and ordered the officials “to distribute the 
waters of the Culebra river, and its tributaries, in accordance with the 
[1889 and 1905] decrees of this court.”
185
 
The Vigil court’s ruling that the Hallett Decrees were binding on the 
parties and their successors but could not be used by state officials in 
determining how to distribute water is in accordance with federal and 
Colorado case law. As explained in the Vigil opinion, the Circuit Court 
for the District of Colorado had sufficient jurisdiction to approve the 
Hallett Decrees. In Colorado, the state water court system has 
jurisdiction over all state-based water rights, including the adjudication 
of priorities and changes in water rights.
186
 At the time that Freehold 
filed suit against the Rio Culebra parciantes, however, federal courts had 
special statutory jurisdiction over suits filed by federally chartered 
corporations.
187
 This special statutory jurisdiction gave the federal circuit 
court power to hear Freehold’s case because Freehold was federally 
chartered.
188
 Even with this special statutory jurisdiction, however, the 
federal court did not have the power to alter a state water rights decree by 
reducing or invalidating the parciantes’ water rights.
189
 In the case that 
produced the Hallett Decrees, however, the Eighth Circuit held that the 
question of law was not the validity of the parciantes water rights, but 
 
184. Id.  
185. Id.  
186. See In re Tonko v. Mallow, 154 P.3d 397, 404 (Colo. 2007). 
187. “It is contended that the circuit court had no jurisdiction, because the bill 
contains no allegation of the diverse citizenship of the parties, or of any other 
jurisdictional ground. But it has an averment that the appellant is a corporation organized 
under an act of congress (16 Stat. 192), and that fact makes this a case ‘arising under the 
laws of the United States,’ and confers jurisdiction upon the federal court.” U.S. Freehold 
Land & Emmigration Co. v. Gallegos, 89 F. 769, 771 (8th Cir. 1898) (citations omitted). 
This federal statute has since been repealed. See Am. Nat’l Red Cross v. S.G., 505 U.S. 
247, 251 (1992). 
188. Order Findings and Decree, supra note 175, at 3. 
189. Weiland v. Reorganized Catlin Consol. Canal Co., 156 P. 596, 597 (Colo. 
1916) (“The statutes designate the District Court vested with exclusive jurisdiction to 
adjudicate priorities to the use of water for irrigation in a water district. When jurisdiction 
for that purpose has attached and a decree is entered, the statutes on that subject 
necessarily inhibit any other court of coordinate jurisdiction from modifying, reviewing, 
or construing such decree; otherwise there could be, in effect, more than one decree, by 
different courts, affecting the same priority to the use of water in the same water district, 
which it is the object of the statutes to avoid.”); see also City of Grand Junction v. City & 
Cnty. of Denver, 960 P.2d 675, 681 (Colo. 1998); Hazard v. Joseph W. Bowles Reservoir 
Co., 287 P. 854, 855 (Colo. 1930). 
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rather whether the parciantes’ diversion of water constituted trespass in 
light of Freehold’s ownership of the land bordering the Culebra.
190
 
Because the federal courts interpreted the dispute to not involve the 
validity of state water rights, and because the Hallett Decrees were 
consent decrees that essentially acted as contracts transferring portions of 
the parciantes’ 1889 water rights to Freehold,
191
 the Federal Circuit 
Court for the District of Colorado had jurisdiction to enter the Hallett 
Decrees. 
Although the Hallett Decrees were binding between the parties to 
them, because they were not Colorado decrees, they could not authorize 
use of Colorado water rights at locations other than those for which the 
rights were originally decreed. When the parciantes challenged the 
Hallett Decrees in state court in Vigil v. Swanson, therefore, the state 
court was presented with a conflict: the Hallett Decrees were validly 
entered and binding on the parties to the decrees, but Freehold had not 
returned to state court to change the Freehold Interests’ location of 
use.
192
 Colorado law has always recognized the right of individual users 
to sell or otherwise transfer their water rights, absent injury to other 
water users.
193
 However, the State Engineer and other water officials are 
required to administer water according to users’ decreed priorities.
194
 
Therefore, if a water right is not decreed according to state law, it 
 
190. Freehold, 89 F. at 772.  
191. United States v. N. Colorado Water Conservancy Dist., 608 F.2d 422, 430 
(10th Cir. 1979) (citing United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223 
(1975)) (“A consent decree or order is to be construed for enforcement purposes basically 
as a contract.”). The Colorado Supreme Court has held that private agreements that 
“modify rights incident to water right ownership” are valid where the modifications do 
not run counter to the purpose of the law or strip water courts of their jurisdiction. See Ft. 
Lyon Canal Co. v. Catlin Canal Co., 642 P.2d 501, 506, 509 (Colo. 1982) (upholding a 
mutual ditch company bylaw requiring board approval before a shareholder could seek to 
change a water right where the bylaw did not “oust the water court of jurisdiction, . . . 
conflict with the purposes of the Water Right Act or unduly interfere with the water 
court’s exercise of its authority pursuant to that statute”). The Tenth Circuit has adopted 
this holding in the context of consent decrees entered in federal court. See Application of 
City & Cnty. of Denver By & Through Bd. of Water Comm’rs, 935 F.2d 1143, 1151–52 
(10th Cir. 1991) (applying the Colorado Supreme Court’s holding in Ft. Lyon Canal Co. 
to rule on Denver’s contention that requiring compliance with a provision of a federal 
consent decree between Denver and the U.S. would violate Colorado water law).  
192. Order Findings and Decree, supra note 175. 
193. Strickler v. City of Colo. Springs, 26 P. 313, 316 (1891) (“[T]he [water] right 
may be transferred by sale so long as the rights of others, as in this case, are not 
injuriously affected thereby.”). 
194. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-92-301(3), -501, -503 (2014). 
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generally cannot be enforced.
195
 This is true even when a water right is 
validly transferred from one user to another.
196
 Any change in water use 
from that contemplated in an original decree must be brought before a 
state court through a change of use action.
197
 Accordingly, as federal 
decrees the Hallett Decrees could not authorize changing the Freehold 
Interests’ location of use from the original acequias to the Culebra-
Sanchez Canal. 
Thus, the Vigil court’s ruling was correct. Insofar as the Hallett 
Decrees transferred ownership of water rights from the parciantes to 
Freehold they were valid under Colorado law. A private agreement or 
consent decree that transfers ownership does not violate Colorado law or 
deprive Colorado courts of jurisdiction because Colorado law allows 
water rights to change hands without the involvement of a court.
198
 
Because only a Colorado court can approve a change in place of use or 
 
195. Concerning Application for Water Rights of Turkey Canon Ranch Ltd. Liab. 
Co., 937 P.2d 739, 749 (Colo. 1997) (citing People ex rel. Simpson v. Highland Irrigation 
Co., 917 P.2d 1242, 1252-53 (Colo. 1996) (“Absent an adjudication under the Act, water 
rights are generally incapable of being enforced.”); Cresson Consol. Gold Min. & Mill. 
Co. v. Whitten, 338 P.2d 278, 283 (1959)). 
196. See City of Englewood v. Burlington Ditch, Reservoir & Land Co., 235 P.3d 
1061 (Colo. 2010). 
197. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37–92–302(1)(a), 203(1), 103(5); In re Tonko, 154 P.3d 
397, 405 (Colo. 2007) (citing Santa Fe Trail Ranches Prop. Owners Ass’n v. Simpson, 
990 P.2d 46, 55–56 (Colo. 1999) (“Water use at a place other than that anticipated by the 
original decree can be used to establish historic use in a change proceeding, but only if 
the change is inconsequential and there is no question of enlargement or abandonment.”); 
Se. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. Rich, 625 P.2d 977, 980 (Colo. 1981)). 
198. Even if the parciantes had never used the amounts of water they granted to 
Freehold in the Hallett Decrees, the transfer of ownership of the rights was valid. Though 
the owner of a water right may sell the right without court approval, the sale of the right 
may not result in increased water use. Enlarged Southside Irr. Ditch Co. v. John’s Flood 
Ditch Co., 183 P.2d 552, 554 (Colo. 1947) (“The owner of a priority for irrigation has no 
right . . . to lend, rent or sell to others the excess water after irrigation of the land for 
which it was appropriated.”). However, it is not the sale of the water right that is 
unlawful, but the expanded use that subsequently takes place. See Baker v. City of 
Pueblo, 289 P. 603, 603–06 (1930) (rejecting city’s application to change recently 
purchased irrigation water rights because the change would result in expanded use, but 
not commenting on the validity of the city’s acquisition of the rights). Colorado law 
makes no provision for halting or invalidating a transfer of ownership of a water right 
simply because the transfer may result in expanded use. Rather, water rights holders can 
enforce the prohibition against expanded use by seeking an injunction to halt expanded 
use, see, e.g., id. at 583–84, or by objecting to a proposed change in manner or place of 
use that will lead to expanded use, see, e.g., In re Water Rights of Cent. Colorado Water 
Conservancy Dist., 147 P.3d 9 (Colo. 2006). Because the sale of a water right cannot be 
invalid simply because it could lead to expanded use, even if the parciantes had never 
used the amounts of water they granted to Freehold, the transfer of ownership was valid. 
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diversion of a Colorado water right, however, the Hallett Decrees could 
not have changed the Freehold Interests place of diversion or use. 
Accordingly, it was inappropriate for Colorado water officials to rely of 
the Hallett Decrees rather than the 1889 Decree in determining where to 
deliver the Freehold Interests, as Vigil found. 
B. The Type of Ownership Interests Created By the Hallett 
Decrees 
As discussed in Section (a) above, the Hallett Decrees were valid 
insofar as they constituted an agreement by the parciantes to transfer a 
portion of their water rights to Freehold. Were the Decrees alone enough 
to effect such a transfer, or was a deed required? Under current Colorado 
law, “[t]he conveyance of a water right requires that the same formalities 
be observed as in the conveyance of real estate.”
199
 However, early water 
law cases upheld oral agreements transferring ownership of water rights 
in more than one instance without requiring the execution a deed.
200
 In 
the 1909 case Park v. Park, the Colorado Supreme Court even upheld an 
oral agreement that conflicted with the applicable water rights decree, in 
the name of equity.
201
 Although ownership of the Freehold Interests was 
only confirmed by deed in the case of the rights on the San Acacio 
Ditch,
202
 the permissive case law regarding water rights agreements in 
the late nineteenth and early twenteith centuries combined with the 
District Court’s conclusion in Vigil v. Swanson indicate that the Hallett 
Decrees created real and enforceable property rights in the form of the 
Freehold Interests. 
 
199. Navajo Dev. Co. v. Sanderson, 655 P.2d 1374, 1378 (Colo. 1982). See also 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-30-102(2) (2009) (“In the conveyance of water rights in all cases, 
except where the ownership of stock in ditch companies or other companies constitutes 
the ownership of a water right, the same formalities shall be observed and complied with 
as in the conveyance of real estate.”). 
200. See, e.g., Park v. Park, 101 P. 403, 405-06 (Colo. 1909); Caldwell v. States, 6 
P.2d 1, 1 (Colo. 1931). 
201. Park, 101 P. at 405-06 (citing Schilling et al. v. Rominger, 4 Colo. 104 (1878); 
McLure v. Koen, 25 Colo. 284 (1898)) (“Oral agreements concerning priorities and title 
to water rights, followed with its change of possession and application by the claimant, 
have heretofore been held valid by this court, also that part performance will take it out of 
the statute of frauds, and equity will enforce the right thus acquired.”). 
202. See Quit-Claim Deed from San Luis Water and Power to Sanchez Ditch and 
Reservoir Company (Apr. 18, 1956), in COSTILLA COUNTY, COLORADO, RECORD BOOK 
162, at 160 (County Recorder’s Office, San Luis, Colorado) [hereinafter Quit-Claim 
Deed from San Luis Water]. 
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C. Post-Vigil Developments 
In the decades following Vigil, San Luis Power apparently made no 
further attempts to utilize the Freehold Interests. After the 1905 
supplemental adjudication, the next District 24 supplemental 
adjudication did not take place until 1935.
203
 Accordingly, although the 
Sanchez System had been in use since 1912, the 1935 adjudication was 
the first time that San Luis Power’s water rights created by use of the 
System were adjudicated. 
In its statement of claim filed in the 1935 adjudication, San Luis 
Power sought recognition of water rights for each canal, ditch, and 
reservoir of the Sanchez System “from the unappropriated waters” of the 
Culebra and its tributaries.
204
 Because the Freehold Interests were 
recognized as appropriated in the 1889 Decree,
205
 San Luis Power 
appears not to have cited the Freehold Interests as a basis for its claimed 
appropriation of water rights for the Sanchez System. Indeed, the decree 
from the 1935 adjudication states: “no part of the water rights of said 
Sanchez System for direct irrigation [or storage] has heretofore been 
decreed.”
206
 Accordingly, the 1935 adjudication indicates that, post-
Vigil, San Luis Power did not claim the Freehold Interests for use in the 
Sanchez system or seek to have the Freehold Interests transferred for use 
in the Sanchez System. Rather, in the 1935 adjudication the company 
sought recognition of new water rights to previously unappropriated 
water. 
The conclusion that San Luis Power did not use the Freehold 
Interests in the Sanchez system post-Vigil is further supported by the fact 
that San Luis Power apparently did not include the Freehold Interests 
when it conveyed the Sanchez System and associated water rights to the 
Sanchez Ditch and Reservoir Company (“Sanchez Reservoir Co.”) in 
 
203. 1935 Decree, supra note 95. 
204. Sanchez Statement of Claim, supra note 166 at 5–18. 
205. See Hallett Decrees, supra note 7, at 2; 1889 Decree, supra note 69. 
206. 1935 Decree, supra note 95, at 83–84. The 1935 decree makes an exception to 
this statement for Eastdale 1 and 2 Reservoirs, the Eastdale 1 and 2 Canals, the Eastdale 
Culebra No. 1 Ditch, and the Culebra-Eastdale Ditch (“Eastdale structures”), as rights for 
these structures were decreed in the 1905 decree. Id. The claimant for rights for the 
Eastdale structures in the 1905 decree was the Eastdale Land, Canal, and Reservoir 
Company. 1905 Decree, supra note 138, at 26–29, 35. Because Costilla Investment 
owned the Freehold Interests in 1905, see supra note 141 and 142 and accompanying 
text, the water rights obtained for the Eastdale structures in the 1905 decree could not 
have been based on the Freehold Interests. Costilla Estate Co. acquired the Easdale 
structures from Eastdale Land, Canal, and Reservoir Company in 1909, and transferred 
them to San Luis Power in the same year. Deed from Costilla Estate Co. to San Luis 
Power, supra note 95. 




 The deed for the Sanchez System specifically mentions one of 
the Hallett Decrees in the context of noting that the decree modified the 
San Acacio Ditch water right included in the deed.
208
 However, the deed 
makes no other mention of the Hallett Decrees and does not include a 
catchall phrase transferring any and all unenumerated water rights 
belonging to San Luis Power.
209
 In Colorado, when a deed expressly 
conveys specific water rights, unmentioned water rights are not 
implicitly conveyed.
210
 Accordingly, because San Luis Power’s deed to 
Sanchez Reservoir Co. expressly conveys specifically described water 
rights but does not mention the Freehold Interests, the deed could not 
have implicitly conveyed the Freehold Interests. 
San Luis Power was voluntarily dissolved on December 28, 
1956.
211
 Because the company did not transfer the majority of the 
Freehold Interests to Sanchez Reservoir Co., at least some of the 
Freehold Interests remained in the ownership of San Luis Power upon its 
dissolution. Accordingly, the next Section examines what happened to 
the Freehold Interests after San Luis Power dissolved. 
D. Who Currently Owns the Freehold Interests? 
If San Luis Power, the last entity that held title to the Freehold 
Interests, ceased to exist in 1956, who holds title to the Freehold Interests 
today? The answer appears to be twofold. First, a title search conducted 
 
207. Quit-claim Deed from San Luis Water, supra note 202 (conveying Sanchez 
Reservoir and the water rights thereof, Mesita Reservoir and the water rights thereof, 
Eastdale #1 Reservoir storage priority 1934-1, Eastdale #2 Reservoir storage priority 
1934-2, the Culebra-Sanchez Canal with water rights as described in 1935 decree, the 
Romero Ditch and water rights thereof, the Culebra-Cerritos Canal and water rights 
thereof, the Culebra Eastdale Ditch and water rights thereof, the Cordillera Ditch and 
water rights thereof, the Island Ditch and water rights thereof, priorities 61 an 7 for the 
Eastdale #2 Reservoir as laid out in 1905 general adjudication, priorities 60 and 6 for the 
Eastdale-Culebra #1 Ditch as laid out in 1905 general adjudication, and the San Acacio 
Ditch and the water rights thereof as modified by the Hallett Decrees and Vigil v. 
Swanson). 
208. Id. 
209. Id. The deed does say that the structures and water rights it conveys are 
transferred “together with all appropriations, filings, adjudications, application, users, 
decrees or filings made, entered, or availed of as incident thereto or therewith and all sites 
rights of way, and easements of and for said reservoirs . . . canals, ditchs, and segments 
thereof conveyed hereby, with all structures thereon and appurtenances thereto.” Id. 
However, because the Hallett Decrees do not involve any of the rights or structures 
transferred, they do not appear to be covered by this language. 
210. Nielson v. Newmyer, 228 P.2d 456, 459 (Colo. 1951). 
211. Colorado State Archives Records, San Luis Power & Water Co., No. 49249, 
Dec. 28, 1956 [hereinafter San Luis Power & Water Records]. 
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by the authors revealed that Freehold and its successors transferred small 
portions of the Freehold Interests to landowners along the Hallett 
acequias between 1900, when the Hallett Decrees were entered, and 
1956, when San Luis Power dissolved without transferring most of its 
remaining Freehold Interests to Sanchez Reservoir Co.
212
 Accordingly, it 
is possible that a portion of the Freehold Interests are currently held by 
landowners along the original acequias, although further legal and title 
research would be required to determine if that is the case.
213
 
Second, the portion of the Freehold Interests that were not alienated 
by Freehold or its successors, but instead remained in the possession of 
San Luis Power when it dissolved, are now held by the Costilla County 
Public Trustee. Under Colorado Law, title to the remaining interests of 
any corporation that dissolved prior to January 1, 1959 passed to its 
trustees, directors, or managers unless otherwise ordered by decree.
214
 
After dissolution, a deed was only valid if executed by all surviving 
directors.
215
 A sole surviving director had authority to convey property 
formerly held by a corporation alone.
216
 Upon the death of the last 
surviving director, the title to property formerly owned by the 
corporation passes to the Public Trustee of the county in which the 
property was situated.
217
 In such a case, the Public Trustee has full 




The Costilla County Grantor Index contains no record of any 
conveyance of the Freehold Interests by San Luis Power to another entity 
before or after its dissolution on December 18, 1956.
219
 In addition, as of 
1987, no member of San Luis Power’s final board of directors was still 
living.
220
 Once all of the final board members of a Colorado corporation 
 
212. See id. San Luis Power explicitly transferred the Freehold Interests on the San 
Acacio Ditch to Sanchez Reservoir Co in 1956, but did not transfer any other Freehold 
Interest in that deed. 
213. The results of the title search are on file with the authors. Because the title 
search was not conducted by a professional title company, the specific results are not 
included here.  
214. COLO. REV. STAT. § 31-6-5 (1953). 
215. Whatley v. Wood, 366 P.2d 570 (1961).  
216. Hochmuth v. Norton, 9 P.2d 1060 (1932). 
217. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-30-171 (2014). 
218. Id.  
219. See San Luis Power & Water Records, supra note 211. 
220. According to the Colorado State Archives records, the final board members of 
San Luis Power and Water upon its dissolution were Alice S. John, Gerald Hughes, 
Charles J. Hughes, W. Clayton Carpenter, and L. H. Larwill. The authors have not been 
able to demonstrate sufficient legal interest to obtain death certificates for those members 
who died in Colorado, but have been able to identify dates and locations of death for each 
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are deceased, Colorado Law gives the public trustee of the county in 
which any real property remaining in the name of corporation is located 
the power to dispose of that property.
221
 As a result, the Public Trustee 
for Costilla County has the statutory authority to dispose of the Freehold 
Interests. Parts IV and V, below, deal with potential avenues for 
resolving the conflict over the Freehold Interests in light of this fact. 
Before moving on to potential resolutions, however, Section (e) 
examines a past attempt to resolve the lingering uncertainty created by 
the Hallett Decrees—the Colorado Division Engineer’s placement of the 
Freehold Interests on the 1984 abandonment list. 
E. The Division Engineer’s 1984 Abandonment List 
On July 1, 1984, the Colorado Division Engineer released an 
abandonment list for District 24 that listed the amounts of water granted 
to Freehold out of each acequia involved in the Hallett Decrees as 
abandoned.
222
 Under Colorado law, a presumption of abandonment 
arises, and a water right may be listed on an abandonment list, when “the 
person entitled to use [the water available under the water right]” has not 






board member. If the parciantes or another party wishes to move forward with resolution, 
they would need to obtain proof of death for each of these board members. 
221. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-30-171(3)(b) (2014). 
222. Id.  
223. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-402(11) (2014) (stating that 10 years of non-use 
creates a rebuttable presumption of abandonment). 
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Table 3: Comparison of water rights granted to Freehold by the 
Hallett Decrees and water rights listed as abandoned on 1984 
























13.5 9.5 9.5 
San Pedro 10.5 9 9 
Montez 0.25 0.75 0.75 
Vallejos 8.5 8.5 8.5 
San Acacio 23.25 22.75 22.75 
Cerro 22.5 17.5 17.5 
Francisco 
Sanchez 
6.25 6.25 6.25 
Mestas 2.25 2.25 2.25 
San Francisco 10 6 6 
Little Rock 0.25 0.75 0.75 
Torcido 0.50 0.5 0.50 
Abundo 
Martin 
1.75 1.75 1.75 
Guadalupe 
Vigil 
2.5 1.5 1.5 
J. M. J. Maez 0.75 0.75 0.75 
Pando 0.65 0.6 0.6 
Guadalupe 
Sanchez 




224. Colo. Div. of Water Res. Div. 3, Dist. 24 Division Engineer Abandonment List 
(1984); Hallett Decrees, supra note 7, at 1–35; Complaint, Vigil v. Swanson, supra note 
80, at 13–14.  
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Some parciantes on each of the acequias with Freehold Interests 
protested the abandonment listings.
225
 In their protests, the parciantes 
claimed that they owned the allegedly abandoned rights and used them 
on a “regular basis.”
226
 Because the parciantes protested the listing of the 
water rights on the abandonment list, preparations were made for trials to 
determine whether the water rights had in fact been abandoned.
227
 
Sanchez Reservoir Co. intervened in the cases, claiming that findings of 
non-abandonment and subsequent use of the Freehold Interests would 
damage the company’s ability to receive water under its junior priorities 
for the Sanchez System.
228
 
During pre-litigation procedures, the parciantes claimed that they 
owned the water rights in question and had been using them to irrigate 
their fields.
229
 The Division Engineer asked the parciantes to admit that 
they did not own the water rights because the water rights had been 
transferred to Freehold by the Hallett Decrees, and that the parciantes 
had not “ever demanded or requested delivery of” the allegedly 
abandoned rights.
230
 The Engineer also argued that even if the parciantes 
had been using the rights, use of a water right by a party that did not own 
the right could not serve as a defense to abandonment.
231
 The last known 
 
225. See Amended Order Deleting Water Rights from the July 1, 1984 
Abandonment Tabulation, Concerning the Abandonment List of the Div. Engineer for 
Water Div. No. 3, Nos. 84CW77, 84CW78, 84CW79, 84CW82, 84CW83, 84CW84, 
84CW85, 84CW86, 84CW87, 84CW92, 84CW93, 84CW99, 84CW101, 84CW112, 
84CW119, 84CW173, 84CW174 (Dist. Ct. Water Div. 3, Feb. 17, 1987) [hereinafter 
Amended Order]. 
226. See, e.g., Protest to Abandonment List at 2, Concerning the Abandonment List 
of the Div. Engineer for Water Div. No. 3, No. 84CW77 (Dist. Ct. Water Div. 3, Oct. 11, 
1984). 
227. See, e.g., Notice Setting Hearing, Concerning the Abandonment List of the 
Div. Engineer for Water Div. No. 3, No. 84CW77 (Dist. Ct. Water Div. 3, Mar. 22, 
1985). 
228. Motion to Intervene, Concerning the Abandonment List of the Div. Engineer 
for Water Div. No. 3, Nos. 84CW77, 84CW78, 84CW79, 84CW82, 84CW83, 84CW84, 
84CW85, 84CW86, 84CW87, 84CW92, 84CW93, 84CW99, 84CW101, 84CW112, 
84CW119, 84CW173, 84CW174 (Dist. Ct. Water Div. 3, June 28, 1985). 
229. See, e.g., Protest to Abandonment List, supra note 226, at 2. 
230. Request for Admissions, First Set of Interrogatories amd Request for 
Production of Documents at 4, Concerning the Abandonment List of the Div. Engineer 
for Water Div. No. 3, Nos. 84CW78, 84CW79, 84CW82, 84CW83, 84CW86, 84CW87, 
84CW92, 84CW93, 84CW99, 84CW101, 84CW112, 84CW124 84CW100 (Dist. Ct. 
Water Div. 3, Oct. 7, 1985). 
231. Motion in Limine at 2–3, Concerning the Abandonment List of the Div. 
Engineer for Water Div. No. 3, Nos. 84CW77, 84CW78, 84CW79, 84CW82, 84CW83, 
84CW84, 84CW85, 84CW86, 84CW87, 84CW92, 84CW93, 84CW99, 84CW101, 
84CW112, 84CW119, 84CW173, 84CW174 (Dist. Ct. Water Div. 3, Oct. 28, 1985).  
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Before the protest cases went to trial, the Engineer and the 
parciantes entered into a stipulated settlement.
233
 The stipulation noted 
that “all parties desire the preservation of the status quo where possible 
within the bounds of law,” and stated that the Engineer would delete the 
Freehold Interests from the abandonment list if the parciantes complied 
with a list of conditions.
234
 In order for the rights to be removed from the 
list, the parciantes were required to: (1) provide the Engineer with a 
claimed “actual historically irrigated acreage” for each acequia; and (2) 
provide the Engineer with proof of the claimed “actual historically 
irrigated acreage” in the form of an aerial photograph study performed 
by the U.S. Soil Conservation Service or a private engineering firm.
235
 
The study was to determine “the highest amount and location of acreage 
which has been irrigated under each specific water right and priority . . . 
during the last 49 years.”
236
 
Under the stipulation, the Engineer would accept the historically 
irrigated acreage verified by the study as long as the verified acreage did 
not exceed the acreage listed for each acequia in the Hallett Decrees (see 
Table 2 above).
237
 The parciantes agreed to “accept and be bound by” the 
verified acreage even if it was a smaller amount than that listed in the 
Hallett Decrees.
238
 The parciantes further agreed “to limit the use of the 
entire water right as originally decreed in 1889 to the . . . historically 
irrigated acres.”
239
 Once historically irrigated acreage had been verified 
and accepted by both sides, a list would be attached to the stipulation 
specifying “the individual water rights and their corresponding legal 
 
232. Id. at 3 (stating that “[t]he State Engineer and Division Engineer contend that 
the last known owner of the amounts of the water rights which have been included in the 
abandonment tabulation no longer exist”). 
233. Stipulation, Concerning the Abandonment List of the Div. Engineer for Water 
Div. No. 3, Nos. 84CW77, 84CW78, 84CW79, 84CW82, 84CW83, 84CW84, 84CW85, 
84CW86, 84CW87, 84CW92, 84CW93, 84CW99, 84CW101, 84CW112, 84CW119, 
84CW173, 84CW174 (Dist. Ct. Water Div. 3, Nov. 15, 1985) [hereinafter Stipulation 
Concerning Abandonment List in Water Div. No. 3]. 
234. Id. at 2. 
235. Id.  
236. Id. 
237. Id. at 3. 
238. Stipulation Concerning Abandonment List in Water Div. No. 3, supra note 
233, at 4. 
239. Id. 
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descriptions and verified historically irrigated acreage amounts.”
240
 All 
parties agreed to be bound by the list.
241
 
Both the U.S. Soil Conservation Service and a private engineering 
firm completed historically irrigated acreage studies as contemplated by 
the stipulation (the studies’ results are listed in Table 4 below).
242
 
However, disagreements developed between the Engineer and the 
parciantes regarding how the aerial photographs should be interpreted to 
determine “actual historically irrigated acreage.”
243
 The Division 
Engineer refused to accept the results of the studies, asserting that the 
parciantes had not complied with the terms of the stipulation,
244
 but 
nonetheless requested that the court enter an order deleting the Freehold 
Interests from the abandonment list.
245
 The Engineer’s request indicated 
that the state would allow “status quo” conditions to return but would 








242. AM-COR ENGINEERS, INC., VERIFICATION OF ACTUAL HISTORICALLY IRRIGATED 
ACREAGE (1986); SOIL CONSERVATION SERVICE, U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC., IRRIGATED 
ACREAGE MEASUREMET (1986). 
243. See Letter from Richard Kadinger, lawyer for parciantes, to Steve Witte, 
Division Engineer (Jan. 27, 1986) (on file with authors) (alleging that the Engineer’s 
proposed specifications for the study are not in accord with the stipulation because they 
define historically irrigated acreage totoo narrowly); Letter from Steve Witte, Division 
Engineer, to Richard Kadinger, lawyer for parciantes (Feb. 6, 1986) (on file with authors) 
(alleging that parciantes’ proposed specifications for the study are not in accord with the 
stipulation because they define historically irrigated acreage too loosely).  
244. Response to Protestants’ Motion to Dismiss and Vacate Trial Dates and 
Recitation of Legal Authority, Concerning the Abandonment List of the Div. Engineer 
for Water Div. No. 3, Nos. 84CW77, 84CW78, 84CW79, 84CW82, 84CW83, 84CW84, 
84CW85, 84CW86, 84CW87, 84CW92, 84CW93, 84CW99, 84CW101, 84CW112, 
84CW119, 84CW173, 84CW174 (Dist. Ct. Water Div. 3, Jan. 15, 1987) [hereinafter 
Response to Protestants’ Motion]. 
245. Motion to Delete from the July 1, 1984 Abandonment Tabulation, Water Div. 
No. 3, Concerning the Abandonment List of the Div. Engineer for Water Div. No. 3, Nos. 
84CW77, 84CW78, 84CW79, 84CW82, 84CW83, 84CW84, 84CW85, 84CW86, 
84CW87, 84CW92, 84CW93, 84CW99, 84CW101, 84CW112, 84CW119, 84CW173, 
84CW174 (Dist. Ct. Water Div. 3, Jan. 9, 1987). 
246. Id. at 1. 
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Table 4: “Actual historically irrigated acreage” by acequia as 













Maestas 220 222.5 180 
Montez 13 12 12 
Vallejos 1366 1290 680 
Cerro 1867 1884 1,800 
Little Rock 17 17 21 
Guadalupe 
Sanchez 
210 201 200 
San Acacio 2446 2233 1,860 
Guadalupe Vigil 353 320 200 
Francisco 
Sanchez 
336 326 500 
San Luis 
People’s 
1710 1633 1,080 
J.M.J. Maez Not listed Not listed 60 
San Pedro 857 Not listed 840 
Pando 48 Not listed 50 
San Francisco 1178 Not listed 800 
 
The parciantes did not support the Division Engineer’s request, and 
instead asked the court to resolve the disagreement and enforce the 
stipulation.
248
 The parciantes worried that the Engineer’s conception of 
status quo conditions differed from their own,
249
 and that even if the 
Engineer deleted the Freehold Interests from the abandonment list, he or 
future Engineers would still administer District 24 as if the rights had 
 
247. AM-COR ENGINEERS, INC., supra note 242; SOIL CONSERVATION SERVICE, U.S. 
DEPT. OF AGRIC., supra note 242. 
248. See Motion for Relief from Judgment or Order and Recitation of Legal 
Authority, Concerning the Abandonment List of the Div. Engineer for Water Div. No. 3, 
Nos. 84CW77, 84CW85, 84CW87, 84CW92, 84CW93, 84CW119 (Dist. Ct. Water Div. 
3, Jan. 26, 1987). 
249. Id. at 2. The parciantes claimed that the Assistant Attorney General 
representing the State Engineer had sent the parciantes a letter stating that use of the 
Freehold Interests pursuant to the stipulation “would alter historic water usage and 
injure . . . vested rights.” Id. (quoting letter from Assistant Attorney General).   




 For his part, the Engineer claimed that the parciantes 
had “repudiated” the stipulation during a status conference.
251
 
On February 17, 1987 the court entered an order that deleted the 
Freehold Interests from the abandonment list but did not include the 
provisions of the stipulation.
252
 As the Engineer requested, the order 
stated that the deletion of the rights “shall in no way preclude the . . . 
Engineer from placing the above-listed water rights on the 1990 
Abandonment Tabulation.”
253
 However, in an apparent attempt to 
address the concerns of the parciantes the order also stated that the 
deletion “shall in no way prejudice the rights of protestants under the 
Stipulation dated October 31, 1985, if any.”
254
 Following this 1987 
order, no further legal action has taken place to determine the legal 
ownership or status of the Freehold Interests and the issue of who, if 
anyone, owns the Interests or has the right to use them remains 
unresolved. Accordingly, Part IV evaluates potential legal avenues for 
resolving this issue. 
IV. POTENTIAL LEGAL RESOLUTIONS 
The following Part explores whether the Freehold Interests have 
been abandoned, whether the parciantes have the right to use the Interests 
because they are co-tenants in them, and whether the parciantes could 
regain control of the Freehold Interests through an adverse possession 
action. The Freehold Interests likely are subject to a presumption of 
abandonment, and the parciantes likely are not co-tenants in the Interests. 
The parciantes, however, may have adversely possessed the Freehold 
Interests by using them. Although it is possible that the parciantes could 
prevail in an adverse possession action, it is likely that this path would be 
prohibitively expensive and suffer from the same factual difficulties that 
the parciantes confronted in the 1984 Abandonment List settlement 
negotiations, during which conflict arose around proof of historically 
irrigated acreage. Therefore, a different strategy for resolution of the 
ownership of the Freehold Interests is proposed in Part V. This Part, 
 
250. Memorandum Brief in Support of Motion to Alter or Amend Orders, or for 
New Trials at ¶ 5, Concerning the Abandonment List of the Div. Engineer for Water Div. 
No. 3, Nos. 84CW77, 84CW78, 84CW79, 84CW82, 84CW83, 84CW84, 84CW85, 
84CW86, 84CW87, 84CW92, 84CW93, 84CW99, 84CW101, 84CW112, 84CW119, 
84CW173, 84CW174 (Dist. Ct. Water Div. 3, Jan. 26, 1987). 
251. Response to Protestants’ Motion, supra note 244, at 2. 
252. Amended Order, supra note 225. 
253. Id. at 4. 
254. Id. 
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however, contains important information for the parciantes as they 
consider their legal position. 
A. The Freehold Interests Likely Are Subject to a Presumption of 
Abadonment 
“‘Abandonment of a water right’ means the termination of a water 
right in whole or in part as a result of the intent of the owner thereof to 
discontinue permanently the use of all or part of the water available 
thereunder.”
255
 A period of ten years of non-use creates a rebuttable 
presumption of intent to abandon “by the person entitled to use [the 
water right].”
256
 Because the majority of the Freehold Interests were not 
transferred to an entity that currently exists, the Interests have apparently 
not been used “by the person entitled to” do so since at least 1956.
257
 The 
Interests are therefore subject to a presumption of abandonment. 
Because Freehold evidently owned some land along some of the 
acequias,
258
 it is possible that Freehold could have legally used the 
Freehold Interests by leasing out land and accompanying water served by 
the original acequias. However, if Freehold or its successors attempted to 
use the Freehold Interests on land other than that to which it was decreed 
in 1889, such use would not rebut a presumption of abandonment. 
Colorado courts have held that use of a water right through an 
unofficially changed point of diversion can lead to a presumption of 
abandonment but is not necessarily enough to prove intent to abandon.
259
 
Rather, they have emphasized that even when the actual point of 
diversion is different from that described in the decree, if the right is 
being used for the purposes and on the land described, abandonment 
cannot be proven.
260
 Therefore, use by Freehold, its lessees, or 
 
255. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103 (2014). 
256. Id. § 37-92-402(11). 
257. See discussion of undivided interests infra Part IV.B. 
258. See supra discussion of Costilla Investment’s participation in the 1905 
supplemental adjudication in Section II.D. 
259. Wolfe v. Jim Hutton Educ. Found., No. 2015 CO 17, slip op. at 2 (Colo. 2015) 
(“We hold that when the Engineers prove that the water rights holder has not used the 
decreed point of diversion for ten years or more, the Engineers trigger the rebuttable 
presumption of abandonment . . . Once triggered, the burden shifts to the water rights 
holder to deminstrate a lack of intent to abandon”).  
260. See, e.g., Means v. Pratt, 331 P.2d 805, 807 (Colo. 1958) (“That the point of 
diversion as fixed in the original decree renders it impossible to divert water into the 
ditch, as originally located, strongly suggests that such point was erroneously described 
and fixed in the decree. If the users of this water intended to, and thought that they were 
diverting water from Dry Creek under the decreed priority . . . certainly no intention to 
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successors in interest on land served by the original acequias would 
likely rebut a presumption of abandonment for that period of use. 
Colorado courts have not considered an abandonment case in which 
the place of use, in addition to the point of diversion, has been changed. 
The Colorado Supreme Court has, however, held that use of water rights 
for non-decreed uses cannot be used to establish historical use for the 
purpose of a change-in-use proceeding.
261
 In Santa Fe Trail Ranches 
Property Owners Association v. Simpson, Santa Fe Trail Ranches sought 
to change the use of two water rights originally decreed to Colorado Fuel 
and Iron Company.
262
 The original rights were for domestic and 
manufacturing uses, but were leased by Colorado Fuel and Iron to El 
Moro Ditch for irrigation purposes through a different point of diversion 
for more than thirty years.
263
 Although Colorado Fuel and Iron never 
sought a change in use for its lease to El Moro Ditch, Santa Fe Trail 
Ranches presented evidence of historic use by El Moro Ditch to the 
Water Court as part of its own change in use application.
264
 The Water 
Court held and the Colorado Supreme Court confirmed that: “an 
undecreed change of use of a water right cannot be the basis for 
calculating the amount of consumable water that can be decreed for 
change to another use.”
265
 Because use of water for an undecreed use at 
an undecreed location cannot be the basis for calculating historical use of 
a water right, it is likely that a court would hold that use of a water right 
at an undecreed location cannot rebut a presumption of abandonment. 
In light of Santa Fe Trail Ranches, it is unlikely that Freehold could 
have avoided abandoning the Freehold Interests by using them on land 
that they were not decreed to. It is possible, however, that Freehold could 
have avoided abandonment if it continued to use the Freehold Interests 
 
abandon can be inferred . . . all of the evidence points to a regular and continued 
diversion and use of water from Dry Creek for the irrigation of this farm for more than 40 
years.”); see also Corey v. Long, 138 P.2d 930, 932 (Colo. 1943) (“The defendants, by 
changing the point of diversion, or by procuring a priority decree in which the point of 
diversion was erroneously described, did not thereby lose the right to the water which 
they had theretofore appropriated and which they had continued to use.”). 
261. Santa Fe Trail Ranches Prop. Owners Ass’n v. Simpson, 990 P.2d 46, 49 
(Colo. 1999) (“Diversions made pursuant to a decreed water right, when not used for 
decreed uses, may not be considered as establishing historical use for the purpose of a 
change of water right proceeding, regardless of whether the water commissioner was 
aware of such diversions and did not order their discontinuance or curtailment.”). 
262. Id.  
263. Id. at 50. 
264. Id. at 51. 
265. Id. at 52. 
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on land served by the acequias the Interests were originally decreed to, 
even if the use was via a different point of diversion. 
B. The Parciantes Likely Are Not Co-Tenants in the Freehold 
Interests, and It Is Thus Unlikely That Their Use of the Freehold 
Interests Prevented Abandonment 
A water right that is used by a co-tenant in the right is not subject to 
abandonment due to lack of use.
266
 Accordingly, because the Freehold 
Interests are likely subject to a presumption of abandonment, whether or 
not a court would find that they have been abandoned may turn on 
whether parciantes on the original acequias are co-tenants in the rights 
with Freehold and its successors. Colorado case law suggests that it is 
unlikely that a court would find that the parciantes are co-tenants in the 
Freehold Interests.. 
In Cache La Poudre Irrigation Company v. Larimer & Weld 
Reservoir Company, the Supreme Court of Colorado held that where two 
or more people are co-tenants in a water right, use of the water right by 
any co-tenant avoids abandonment.
267
 However, a subsequent case, City 
and County of Denver v. Just, limited the Cache La Poudre holding by 
stating that normally only stockholders in mutual ditch companies and 
co-tenants of irrigated land are co-tenants in water rights.
268
 
In Just, the single holder of a water right for a ditch executed a 
quitclaim deed that divided the water right into shares and conveyed a 
specific number of shares to each of nine other landowners along the 
ditch.
269
 Years later, Denver claimed that the rights held by one of the 
landowners had been abandoned because the rights had not been used by 
that landowner for an extended period of time.
270
 Citing Cache La 
Poudre, the trial court held that the rights had not been abandoned 
because they had been used by other rights holders on the ditch.
271
 The 
Supreme Court of Colorado reversed the trial court, holding that the 
landowners were not co-tenants in the water right, and that use by a non-
co-tenant was not a defense to abandonment.
272
 The Supreme Court 
 
266. See Cache La Poudre Irrigation Co. v. Larimer & Weld Reservoir Co., 53 P. 
318 at 320–21 (Colo. 1898). 
267. See id. (stating that “one tenant in common may preserve the entire estate held 
in common”).  
268. City and County of Denver v. Just, 487 P.2d 367, 369 (Colo. 1971). 
269. Id. at 367–68. 
270. Id. at 368. 
271. Id. at 368–69. 
272. See id. at 369. 
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distinguished Cache La Poudre by noting that Cache La Poudre 
involved a mutual ditch company while Just did not.
273
 The court stated 
that “[e]xcluding consideration of stockholders in mutual ditch 
companies, ordinarily, for persons to be tenants in common in an 
irrigation water right, they must be owners as tenants in common of the 
lands upon which the water is used.”
274
 Because the water right deed 
conveyed “designated fractional amount[s] of a water priority” rather 
than “undivided interests in co-tenancy,” the court held that the deed did 
not create a co-tenancy in the water right even if doing so was possible 
outside of a mutual ditch company or co-tenancy in land.
275
 The court 
distinguished the ownership structure in Just from a mutual ditch 
company by noting that in Just, there was no attempt to transfer 




The Just court did not exclude the possibility that co-tenancy in a 
water right might arise outside of a mutual ditch company or co-tenancy 
in irrigated land, and in Kountz v. Olson, the court found that co-tenancy 
existed without either.
277
 In Kountz, ten water users on a single ditch 
agreed orally that each would hold a one-tenth “interest” in the ditch and 
its water right.
278
 The court stated that through their agreement, the users 
“became tenants in common.”
279
 
While the parciantes on the acequias affected by the Hallett Decrees 




273. Just, 487 P.2d at 369. 
274. Id. (citing City of Telluride v. Davis, 80 P. 1051 (Colo. 1905)). The Telluride 
court held that there is no co-tenancy in a water right where the holders of the right use 
their portions of the right on separately owned pieces of land because in such a situation 
“the right to a unity of possession necessary to constitute a tenancy in common d[oes] not 
extend to the right of user, which is essential to the existence of such a tenancy in a water 
right.” Telluride, 80 P. at 1052. 
275. Just, 487 P.2d at 369–70. 
276. Id. at 370. 
277. Kountz v. Olson, 29 P.2d 627, 629 (Colo. 1934). 
278. Id. 
279. Id. Though the water users in Kountz had equal interests in their water right, 
equal interests are not required for co-tenancy to exist. 20 Am. Jur. 2d Co-tenancy and 
Joint Ownership § 31 (stating that in co-tenancy, property “may be owned in equal or 
unequal undivided shares, with each person having an equal right to possess the whole 
property”). 
280. Acequia parciantes may be co-tenants in their acequia’s water rights because 
an acequia is like a mutual ditch company. Currently, “acequia ditch corporations” are 
governed by COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-42-101.5 (2014), which is located in the same section 
of statutes that govern mutual and carrier ditch companies. Acequias are more like mutual 
ditches than carrier ditches because mutual ditches are nonprofit organizations created to 
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is unlikely that Freehold became a co-tenant with the parciantes as a 
result of the Hallett Decrees. Like the water deed in Just, which 
conveyed “designated fractional amount[s] of a water priority” rather 
than “undivided interests in co-tenancy,”
281
 the Hallett Decrees appear to 
divide the priorities, transferring specific amounts of water to 
Freehold.
282
 Co-tenancy requires that each co-tenant have the right to 
possess the entire property,
283
 but the Hallett Decrees state that Freehold 
is “entitled to take and use” the portion of each priority transferred to it, 
whereas the parciantes are entitled to “the remainder” of each priority, 
suggesting that neither party has the right to possess the entire water 
right.
284
 Just and Kountz suggest that co-tenancy arises only when parties 
intend or arrange for a water right to be held in common. Accordingly, it 
is likely that a court would hold that Freehold and the parciantes were 
not co-tenants in the Hallett decree water rights. Because it is unlikely 
that the Hallett Decrees made Freehold and the parciantes co-tenants in 
Freehold Interests, and because use by a non-co-tenant is not a defense to 
abandonment, it is unlikely that use of the Freehold Interests by the 




distribute water to shareholders who own water rights, while carrier ditches are for-profit 
companies that own water rights and sell water to customers. (See Nelson v. Lake Canal 
Co. of Colo., 644 P.2d 55, 57–58 (Colo. App. 1981). In addition, COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-
30-101(2) (2014) recognizes that acequias are “nonprofit association[s]”). Because 
acequias are community organizations that treat water as a communal resource, they 
share the cooperative nature of a mutual ditch company and the arrangement between the 
water users in Kountz. Accordingly, it is possible that parciantes on the acequias affected 
by the Hallett Decrees could have been or could be co-tenants in the water rights of their 
respective acequias.  
Furthermore, the mutual ditch company system was modeled, in Colorado, on the acequia 
system. In the 1870s, Benjamin Eaton, who had worked on the Maxwell Grant in New 
Mexico, came to Greeley, Colorado, where he built the Union Colony No. 2 canal 
modeled in part on the acequias he had observed in New Mexico. Eaton went on the build 
the High Line Canal in Denver and the Weld Canal in Fort Collins, and was Governor of 
Colorado from 1885 to 1887. See generally JANE E. NORRIS & LEE G. NORRIS, WRITTEN 
IN WATER: THE LIFE OF BENJAMIN HARRISON EATON (1990). This historical connection 
further supports the proposition that acequia irrigators, like members of a mutual ditch 
company, should be considered co-tenants in their water rights. 
281. City and County of Denver v. Just, 487 P.2d 367, 369–70 (Colo. 1971). 
282. See Hallett Decrees, supra note 7. 
283. See 20 Am. Jur. 2d Co-tenancy and Joint Ownership § 31. 
284. U.S. Freehold Land & Emigration Co. v. Albert, No. 2548, slip op. at 2 
(C.C.D. Colo. Filed July 17, 1900). 
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C. The Parciantes Could Potentially Rebut a Presumption of 
Abandonment Through Adverse Possession 
While a non-co-tenant’s use of a water right cannot rebut a 
presumption of abandonment, such use can defeat that presumption 
through adverse possession.
285
 Although adverse possession cannot 
revive a water right that has been abandoned,
286
 “evidence rebutting the 
presumption of abandonment may . . . be adduced by an adverse 
possession claimant who demonstrates his or her continuous use of [a] 
deeded owner’s interest in [an] adjudicated water right.”
287
 Accordingly, 
the parciantes’ use of the Freehold Interests could rebut a presumption of 
abandonment if such use was demonstrated in connection with an 
adverse possession claim and the parciantes could prove that their 
adverse use occurred before the Freehold Interests were abandoned.
288
 
Under Colorado law, water rights are considered real property and 
are subject to adverse possession under the terms of Colorado’s adverse 
possession statutes.
289
 Adverse possession of water rights can only occur 
“between rival claimants to the possession and use of water . . . after the 
water’s diversion from the stream pursuant to an adjudicated water 
right.”
290
 As only Freehold and the parciantes owned water rights on the 
acequias affected by the Hallett Decrees,
291
 the parciantes would have 
used the Freehold Interests by using any amount of water greater than the 
amount they retained under the Hallett Decrees. Because adverse 
 
285. Archuleta v. Gomez, 200 P.3d 333, 344 (Colo. 2009).  
286. Id. at 344. 
287. Id. 
288. Coffey v. Emigh, 25 P. 83, 86 (Colo. 1890) (quoting Bush v. Stanley, 13 N.E. 
249 (Ill. 1887) (Because “[t]he doctrine of laches can only be invoked by one in 
possession against one out of possession,” and cannot defeat an adverse possession claim, 
the long period of time between when the parciantes may have obtained ownership of the 
Hallett rights and when any potential claim of adverse possession may be brought in the 
future should not be a barrier to a claim of adverse possession). Additionally, because “a 
grantor may originate a possession adverse to his grantee,” the fact that the parciantes 
granted the Hallett rights to Freehold through the Hallett Decrees does not bar the 
parciantes from adversely possessing the rights. Hitchens v. Milner Land, Coal & 
Townsite Co.,178 P. 575, 577 (Colo. 1919). 
289. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 38-41-101, -106 (2014). COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-41-106 
applies when property is adversely possessed under color of title and is thus not 
applicable to the present case. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-41-101 applies when property is 
adversely possessed without color of title, and provides that “[ei]ghteen years’ adverse 
possession of any land shall be conclusive evidence of absolute ownership.” 
290. Archuleta, 200 P.3d at 342. 
291. See U.S. Freehold Land & Emigration Co. v. Albert, No. 2548, slip op. at 2 
(C.C.D. Colo. July 17, 1900). 
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possession cannot revive an abandoned water right, determining the 
validity of an adverse possession claim requires assessing whether the 
right’s record owner abandoned it before the adverse possession 
occurred.
292
 In order to obtain ownership through adverse possession, a 
claimant must adversely possess a piece of property continuously for the 
required statutory period,
293
 which was twenty years in 1908.
294
 The 
Colorado Supreme Court has also noted that: “adverse possession [of a 
water right] is very difficult to establish.”
295
 
The reason that adverse possession is so difficult to establish is that 
claimants are required to demonstrate actual possession of a disputed 
water right through beneficial use.
296
 The Colorado Supreme Court has 
held that proof of beneficial use requires quantification of that use, 
stating that in order to show actual possession, a claimant must 
“establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, the amount of water 
expressed in acre feet belonging to the deeded owner’s water right that 
the adverse claimant has placed to beneficial consumptive use.”
297
 
Where a claimant holds water rights in addition to those he claims 
through adverse possession, the claimant must show that his total 




In order for the parciantes to make a valid claim of adverse 
possession of the Freehold Interests they would need to produce evidence 
that they have, in fact, used the Interests. Supporting such a claim would 
require a detailed investigation by a water engineer employing aerial 
photos and other evidence of use during the required statutory period, 
and would also require refuting inevitable cross-claims of abandonment. 
V. RECOMMENDATION FOR A RESOLUTION 
The Hallett Decrees were valid binding agreements between the 
parciantes and Freehold and accordingly transferred portions of the 
parciantes’ water rights to Freehold. Under Vigil v. Swanson and in 
accordance with Colorado and federal case law, however, the Division 
Engineer and Water Commissioner for Water District 24 are required to 
 
292. Archuleta, 200 P.3d at 344. 
293. See Hodge v. Terrill, 228 P.2d 984, 988 (1951).   
294. COLO. REV. STAT. § 4084 (1908). 
295. Archuleta, 200 P.3d at 344. 
296. Id. at 343, 346. 
297. Id. at 346. 
298. Id. at 346–47.   
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deliver the Freehold Interests to the acequias as the rights were originally 
decreed in the absence of a change decree issued by a Colorado water 
court.
299
 Accordingly, because a water court never entered a change 
decree for the Freehold Interests, current parciantes on the original Rio 
Culebra acequias would be legally justified in calling for the Freehold 
Interests to be delivered to their acequias. Calling for the Freehold 
Interests, however, would likely result in the state or junior right holders 
initiating legal action to have the Freehold Interests declared abandoned. 
Junior appropriators would likely feel that reactivation of the Freehold 
Interests would greatly decrease the juniors’ likelihood of receiving 
water. In addition, the state might feel obligated to protect the rights of 
juniors and preserve what it views as the status quo. 
Because the Freehold Interests’ last record owner no longer 
exists,
300
 and use of a water right by a non-owner is not a defense to 
abandonment,
301
 it is likely that a court would rule that the Freehold 
Interests have been abandoned unless the parciantes can successfully 
demonstrate that they adversely possessed the Interests before 
abandonment occured.
302
 Although it is possible that the parciantes 
adversely possessed the Freehold Interests if they regularly used the 
rights, the extent to which they did so over the past 115 years is 
unclear.
303
 Even if the parciantes have regularly used the Freehold 
Interests, providing the level of proof required to demonstrate adverse 
possession—quantification of the amount of water historically 
beneficially used under the claimed water right—would be complex and 
expensive. 
Because litigation regarding abandonment or adverse possession 
would be costly, contentious, and unpredictable, a settlement agreement 
between all affected parties is likely the most desirable and cost-effective 
way to resolve ownership of the Freehold Interests. Furthermore, the 
settlement process would provide a venue that, unlike litigation, would 
be flexible enough to take into account the tortuous history of the Hallett 
Decrees and the interests of all involved, in order to reach an equitable 
solution. As discussed in Section IV (d), above, the Costilla County 
Public Trustee obtained the power and authority to dispose of the 
Freehold Interests that remained the property of San Luis Power upon the 
last board member’s death in 1987.
304
 However, this power is not 
 
299. See supra Section III.A. 
300. See supra Section III.D. 
301. See supra Section IV.A. 
302. See supra Section IV.C. 
303. See id. 
304. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-30-171 (2014). 
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unfettered. For example, the Public Trustee should not convey the 
Freehold Interests to herself or to a friend or family member, except to 
the extent to which she or they had a valid claim to use the Freehold 
Interests in their decreed locations as of 1987. As an additional example, 
the Public Trustee should not convey the Freehold Interests to a place 
where they cannot lawfully be used. Such a conveyance would 
seemingly be beyond the authority of the Public Trustee because only the 
water court can approve a change in location of use, and the court might 
nullify or call into question the right purporting to be conveyed, thereby 
causing unlawful waste by the Public Trustee of the property interest. 
Thus, the only permissible alternative for the Public Trustee appears to 
be to convey the Freehold Interests to the landowners who could lawfully 
make use of the Freehold Interests in their decreed location, subject to 
the possible claim that all or a portion of the Interests have been 
abandoned. Such a conveyance could consist of undivided interests in the 
appropriate amount of water to individual parciantes or to the respective 
acequias for the use of its parciantes. 
Settlement negotiations should include all users on the original 
acequias and the Public Trustee, and should also be open to other water 
rights owners. Each party may desire to hire its own lawyer or advocate, 
and all parties would likely benefit from the appointment of a neutral 
mediator to oversee the process. Settlement will necessarily avoid injury 
to other users on the Culebra, which as a practical matter probably means 
preserving the status quo to the extent possible.
305
 The settlement process 
has the advantage of avoiding the zero-sum approach of litigation, and 
could account for the needs of junior users through partial abandonment 
of the Freehold Interests or a later stipulated administration date for any 
Freehold Interests transferred back to the parciantes or the acequias. If 
the parties reached a solution, it would need to be adopted by the water 
court to be legally enforceable because it would involve the use of water 
rights. The agreement of other water rights owners to settlement is 
accordingly crucial to avoid litigation on the question of injury. 
As climate change and long-term drought continue to affect the 
water resources of the San Luis Valley, clarifying the legacy of the 
Hallett Decrees and the state of ownership of the Freehold Interests will 
likely become of increasing importance for all water users on the Rio 
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Culebra. Although there is certainly reason for parciantes to be wary of 
initiating a reduction of the water rights decreed to the acequias, it is 
likely that the state of water resources on the Rio Culebra will eventually 
force the issue to some kind of legal resolution. As one user pointed out 
at the 2014 Congreso de Acequias
306
 in San Luis, the longer this issue 
remains unresolved, the more difficult it is for acequias and individual 
parciantes to plan for the future. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The history of non-Indigenous settlement of the West is a story of 
optimism, greed and speculation, conflicts between majority and 
minority groups, and the persistent quest for water in what was once 
called “The Great American Desert.”
307
 The story of the Rio Culebra and 
the conflicts that arose there between Hispanic settlers and later Euro-
American developers is one that played out across the West between 
different actors in different watersheds. On the Rio Culebra this conflict 
took the form of an 1889 Decree awarding recognized water rights to the 
parciantes, complicated within a decade by a law suit brought in federal 
court by the United States Freehold Land and Emigration Company. That 
lawsuit ended in the Hallett Decrees, settlement agreements that 
transferred almost half of the water rights awarded to the parciantes in 
1889 to Freehold.  The parties went back to state court in 1914, arguing 
over whether the Hallett Decrees were valid. The state court concluded, 
in a decision captions Vigil v. Swanson, that the Decrees validly 
transferred the Freehold Interests from the parciantes to Freehold, but did 
not authorize their use in any place other than those to which they were 
decreed in 1889. Apparently Vigil v. Swanson did little to clarify things 
on the ground, and Freehold and its successors in interest never legally 
transferred or used more than a small portion of the Freehold Interests 
before the final owner, San Luis Power and Water, dissolved in 1956. 
The last living board member of San Luis Power passed away in 1987, 
leaving the task of disposing of the remaining Freehold Interests to the 
Public Trustee of Costilla County. This twist of fate has created an 
opportunity for the parciantes to seek a return of at least some portion of 
the Freehold Interests, transferred to Freehold under unequal and perhaps 
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unjust circumstances, through a settlement negotiation that has the 
potential to reach an equitable solution unavailable through litigation. 
 
